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SETTING THE CONDITIONS FOR SELF-RULE:
UNIONS, ASSOCIATIONS, OUR FIRST
AMENDMENT DISCOURSE AND THE PROBLEM OF
DEBARTOLO
THOMAS C. KOHLER*
The National Labor Relations Act consists essentially of two contradictory
themes: the Wagner Act, concerned with associational rights, protects and main-
tains unions, while the Taft-Hartley Amendments, concerned with individual
rights, serve to constrain union activities. In different ways, both portions of the
NLRA are inconsistent with first amendment doctrine.
In this Article, Professor Kohler uses the Supreme Court's recent De-
Bartolo opinion as a vehicle'for exposing this inconsistency and questioning our
general first amendment discourse. He demonstrates that the Court's delicate
reconciliation of the Labor Act with the first amendment is based on a reduc-
tionist view of unions as limited purpose organizations, resulting in their virtual
dissolution as associations. The author urges an alternative discourse that would
recognize the role associations can play as "schools for democracy," and the
contributions they make in setting the conditions for genuine self-government.
"Few discoveries are more irritating than those which expose
the pedigrees of ideas."'
INTRODUCTION
Ideas have consequences. That they do and how they do constitute
the large themes of this Article. These themes will be developed through
the study of a specific issue: the ever problematic relationship between
the first amendment2 and the law structured by the National Labor
Relations Act.3 That a fundamental tension exists between the first
amendment and the statute is clear. What have gone unidentified are
the causes of that tension. As a result, the Supreme Court's repeated
efforts to reconcile the Labor Act to the first amendment have trailed
off into unintelligibility. The ensuing opinions are truly sui generis.
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College. An earlier version of this paper was
given at a faculty workshop at the University of Texas Law School. I am grateful to the
participants for their thoughtful and stimulating questions and comments, as well as for the
hospitality they showed me. As always, I owe special thanks to those whom Burke might
have called my "little platoon": Jack Getman and Mary Ann Glendon; Joe Flanagan and
Fred Lawrence, members, respectively, of the Philosophy and Theology Departments of
Boston College; and to Jim Kuhn and John Delaney, both of the Graduate School of Business,
Columbia University.
1. Lord Acton, quoted in L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 7 (1953).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) [hereinafter the Labor Act].
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They not only resist analysis under prevailing first amendment doc-
trine, but are inconsistent with the central scheme of the statute.4
This Article exposes and analyzes the grounds for the statute's
incompatibility with the first amendment. In so doing, it develops a
comprehensive explanatory framework that rationalizes this badly con-
fused area of law. However, the value of the insights and the expla-
nations that are developed in this Article are not limited to labor law
issues. Nor is this Article confined to doctrinal exposition. Many of the
reasons for the ambivalence toward unions that first amendment doc-
trine conveys are identical with our legal and societal ambivalence
about associations and intermediate groups of all descriptions. Some
grasp of the causes for the reservations and suspicions expressed in first
amendment doctrine toward unions goes a long way toward explaining
our uncertainties about the importance and place of mediating groups
generally. While this Article concentrates on unions, an important part
of its inquiry is how to think about the nature of association generally.
As its discussion proceeds, this Article criticizes first amendment doc-
trine, and the thought that informs it, for failing to recognize that com-
munity forms the basis for individual self-determination. This Article
undoubtedly raises more questions than it answers. To that extent, it
commences rather than completes a research agenda. Throughout, one
of its basic concerns is whether present first amendment doctrine acts
to corrode rather than to enhance the conditions that support self-rule.
The Court's recent and seemingly mundane opinion in Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB (DeBartolo II)5 furnishes an excellent vehicle
for investigating the issues that this Article addresses. DeBartolo II
hardly seems the stuff of great scholarly moment. A relatively brief
opinion, it proceeds at a subconstitutional level and involves the con-
struction of a rather arcane subsection of the Labor Act, which prohibits
certain forms of union secondary boycott activities.6 Moreover, its
4. Several of these failed efforts will be discussed below. The incongruities between
the Act and the Constitution have produced a considerable body of commentary, some of
the more thoughtful of which include: Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious
Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4 (1984); Harper, The Consumer's Emerging
Right to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware and its Implications for American Labor
Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409 (1984); Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First A mendment Values:
Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 189 (1984); St. Antoine, Free Speech
or Economic Weapon? The Persisting Problem of Picketing, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 883(1982);
Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of
Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938 (1982); Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First Amend-
ment, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1469 (1982).
5. 485 U.S. 568 (1988) [hereinafter DeBartolo Ill. For citations to the case's tor-
tuous prior history, see infra note 23.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1982) (The text of this provision is set forth infra
at note 22).
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holding stands for a relatively narrow proposition: in framing the lan-
guage in question, Congress did not intend to outlaw union secondary
appeals made to the public by means other than picketing. 7 DeBartolo
II, however, is a deceptively simple opinion. Its seeming straightfor-
wardness masks layers of complexities. Analysis of the doctrinal issues
raised by the case uncovers these complexities, revealing their intricacy
and interrelation. Further analysis shows that the tension between the
first amendment and the statute is but one expression of more fun-
damental problems that pervade the foundations not only of labor law,
but first amendment doctrine as well.
The tangle of problems that underlie the discontinuities between
the Labor Act and the first amendment can be grouped into two cat-
egories. The first set of problems concerns language. The constitutive
nature of law recently has been rediscovered, and with it, the insight
that law reveals what a society values, aspires to, and thinks of itself.8
Like language, art, music or literature, law acts as a "carrier of mean-
ings." As such, it is another way a society has of "telling a story" about
itself.9 One reason for the confusion that exists between the Labor Act
and first amendment doctrine is that we lack a consistent heuristic
framework in which to think about them. The Wagner Act portion of
the statute10 is framed in terms that emphasize the value of associations
to self-government, and which view them as an important vehicle for
defending and enhancing individual status. " The language of the Wag-
7. DeBartolo 11, 485 U.S. at 578-88.
8. Perhaps the leading voice in this recovery among American legal academicians
has been James Boyd White, although he has not been alone in its restatement. See, e.g., J.
WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); White,
Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 684 (1985). See also, e.g., M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW
1-9, 112-45 (1987); Getman, Voices, 66 TEX. L. REV. 577 (1988); Cover, The Supreme Court,
1982 Term-Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). The understanding
of the constitutive impact of law, of course, has never been wholly absent from our legal
discourse. E.g., Lord Devlin, Law, Democracy and Morality, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1962).
But the insights on which it is based have not been well-represented in American legal thought
in this century. It seems plausible to see this recovery as part of a general renaissance of the
philosophy of practical reason and virtue-based ethical theory, as well as an increased interest
in the application of hermeneutic theory to questions law raises.
9. The term "language" is meant to suggest the patterns of thought, values, shared
expectations and meanings that a form of discourse implies. On meaning and its functions
(including discussions of language and linguistic meaning), see Lonergan, Dimensions of
Meaning, in COLLECTION: PAPERS BY BERNARD LONERGAN 232 (F. Crowe & R. Doran 2d
ed. 1988); B. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 57-99 (1972). See also White, Thinking
About Our Language, 96 YALE L.J. 1960 (1987); On the idea of the law as story, see C.
GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983);
White, supra note 8.
10. Enacted as The National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
11. On the centrality of the autonomous employee association to the scheme
adopted in the Wagner Act's provisions, and the development of the Labor Act itself, see
1990:149
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ner Act parallels themes about human nature and community found
in classical political philosophy.' 2 In the latter's perspective, humans
cannot be understood in the abstract. Instead, humans are regarded as
situated beings, intelligible only in relation to the associational ties that
condition the individual's existence. In this view, community is prior
to the individual. Accordingly, flourishing communities are a precon-
dition to the achievement of one's full human potential and, thereby,
to authentic freedom. The absence of association results in the dimin-
ishment of one's potential and, hence, one's humanity. In this view,
community grounds the possibility for self-government.
In contrast to the Labor Act's Wagner provisions, the Taft-Hartley
portions of the statute' 3-and first amendment doctrine as well-are
framed in a highly individualistic language that places a premium on
personal autonomy. This language strongly tends to regard claims of
community and association as posing a substantial threat to individual
self-direction. 14 It reflects a general view of human nature, reason and
Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27
B.C.L. REV. 499, 513-34 (1986) and sources cited therein.
12. This is not to suggest that the framers of the Wagner Act, nor the unionists and
employers who shaped the practices of collective bargaining which were adopted in the
Wagner Act, looked directly to the classics for their inspiration or for guidance. Rather, the
Wagner Act strongly reflects thought about the nature of humans and community that are
characteristic of the political philosophy of the pre-modern era (i.e., thought associated with
the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition). The Wagner Act, emphasizing as it does the value of
associations to self-government, is an example of a discourse conducted in what Robert Bellah
and his colleagues have termed America's "second language." Our first language, they state,
is framed and carried on in the now more familiar terms of individualism. See R. BELLAH,
R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWINDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDU-
ALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 20-22, 155-57, 334-35 (1985) [hereinafter HAB-
ITS]. This Article suggests that our first amendment discourse is conducted in the "first
language," and that because the Wagner Act and the first amendment employ different lan-
guages, they "speak past" one another.
13. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, ch. 120, § 1, 61 Stat.
136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). The 1947 Taft-Hartley
Act was further amended in 1959 by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(Landrum-Griffin), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 525, 542, § 704(a) (1959) (codified in pertinent
part at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982)). As pertinent to this discussion, the Landrum-Griffin
Amendments extended and clarified the restrictions against so-called union secondary activity
that were first set forth in the Labor Act through the Taft-Hartley amendments.
For ease of reference, both the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act will be referred to corporately as the Taft-Hartley portion of
the Labor Act. (The Landrum-Griffin Act also established a wide-ranging series of protections
for individual union members qua their union. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982 & Supp. V
1987)).
14. The amendment to section 7, referred to as the "heart" of the Labor Act, is
representative of the shift the Taft-Hartley amendments worked in the statute. As set forth
in the Wagner Act, section 7 provided that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
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association that is informed by the thought of Thomas Hobbes, John
Locke and other makers of the Enlightenment reaction to classical the-
ory.
The modem viewpoint portrays humans as self-enlightening, self-
perfecting beings who are endowed with rights that exist by nature, not
social convention. Consequently, humans are perceived as completely
sovereign beings who are prior to any form of community. In contrast
to the classical perspective, in the modem framework, any form of
association is in some way an artifice. Associations have only some
sort of derivative existence that results solely from the affiliative acts
of the individuals who compose them. Likewise, associations of what-
ever description represent no particular or irreducible good in them-
selves. Because any form of affiliation or association can limit indi-
vidual sovereignty, all are regarded as suspect. Further, no association
or community has any legitimate power over its members save that
which the members have ceded voluntarily. In the modern view, free-
dom and self-government tend to be equated with the absence of as-
sociation and its obligations.
Despite the enormous differences in the languages they employ,
the first amendment and both portions of the statute share the same
basic goal. Each seeks to enhance the potential for self-determination.
In the final analysis, however, one portion of the statute states a dis-
tinctly different view of what it means to be a human being than that
enunciated by the remainder of the statute or by our first amendment
doctrine. In short, the law employs two different modes of discourse
that tell two inconsistent stories about the nature both of humans and
of the value and importance of association. Consequently, the law states
two very different views about the conditions that will tend to promote
individual liberty and the practices of self-government.
The second category of problems that underlie the inconsistencies
between the first amendment and the Labor Act grow out of the special
character of our basic labor relations legislation. The National Labor
Relations Act is a statute at war with itself. It essentially consists of
two parts: the Wagner Act provisions, enacted in 1935' 5 and the 1947
Taft-Hartley Amendments, which subsequently were clarified and ex-
tended by the Landrum-Griffin Act. 16 Consistent with the value it
or other mutual aid or protection.
To this the Taft-Hartley amendments added:
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
158(a)(3) of this title.
15. Seesupra note 10.
16. See supra note 13.
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places on employee associations (i.e., unions), the Wagner Act portion
of the statute is directed toward their defense and maintenance.' 7 Its
principal thrust is the removal of impediments to employee self-as-
sociation. Accordingly, the statute's Wagner provisions prohibit em-
ployers from taking discriminatory action against employees who en-
gage in union activities.' 8 They also forbid employers to dominate or
to interfere with employee associations. 19 Central to the Wagner Act,
however, is its exclusivity principle.20 This principle makes the ma-
jority-designated union representative of all the affected employees, and
bars dissidents from forming alternative organizations to represent their
interests.
As noted, the statute's Taft-Hartley provisions reflect an entirely
different view about the value of associations and their contributions
to self-government. Regarding unions as a threat to individual status,
the Labor Act's Taft-Hartley provisions attempt to cabin, constrain
and restrict their activities. 2' These restrictions chiefly take the form
of limitations on the types of speech activities in which employee as-
sociations may engage, and limitations on the audiences to whom those
associations may direct their appeals. 22
17. See Kohler, supra note 11, and sources cited therein.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
20. This principle is set forth in section 9(a) of the Labor Act (29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1982)), which provides that
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment.
See also Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975);
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
21. Two useful and thorough studies describing the development and evaluating
the impact of Taft-Hartley are J. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RE-
LATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION 1937-1947 187-99, 251-59 (1981);
H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL
LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 241-362 (1950).
22. These restrictions are set forth in section 8(b)(4) of the Labor Act, 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(4) (1982), which provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or
a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport,
or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or
to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged
in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object
thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting,
or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufac-
turer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any
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The Labor Act's provisions thus pull in different directions. In-
deed, it is the conjoining of these conflicting views and stories within
one statute that makes the development of any consistent first amend-
ment approach to the Labor Act as a whole so difficult. While both
portions of the Labor Act pose constitutional difficulties, the character
of these difficulties differs. The Wagner Act's exclusivity principle im-
poses significant restrictions upon individuals' first amendment free-
dom to associate. The statute's Taft-Hartley provisions fly in the face
of the first amendment speech guarantees. Nevertheless, despite the
many inconsistencies between the Labor Act and prevailing first
amendment doctrine, the Court consistently has upheld the validity of
both portions of the Labor Act. In doing so, the Court has repeatedly
referred to the special nature of labor legislation to explain its unusual
deference to a statute so incompatible with judicially developed con-
stitutional norms. The Court's opinions are informed by the indivi-
dualistic language in which first amendment discourse is conducted.
Consequently, the cases divide according to the portion of the Labor
Act subject to constitutional challenge. All the cases, however, involve
the same underlying set of problems.
This Article is divided into six parts. By tracing a particular prob-
lem in relation to other issues, the discussion moves into successive
and more fully explanatory perspectives. The first two sections examine
the first amendment problems raised by the statute's Taft-Hartley pro-
visions. Section I analyzes the DeBartolo I opinion. It outlines the
development of the legal problems the case presents, and concludes
that the holding in DeBartolo I cannot be squared with previous in-
terpretations of the first amendment. Section II analyzes the state of
the law in the wake of DeBartolo II and suggests some implications
that flow from its holding. Section III turns to investigate the root causes
for the tensions that exist both within the Labor Act, and between it
and the first amendment. It examines the way first amendment dis-
course has taught us to think about groups and associations. It also
examines the more nuanced view of the character and function of as-
sociation that an alternative discourse suggests. Section IV analyzes a
series of cases dealing with union-security arrangements. These cases
demonstrate how the individualistic language of first amendment dis-
course has affected the way the Court regards the role of unions. Ex-
planations for the Court's continued deference to the Labor Act are
other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative
of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the represent-
ative of such employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided,
That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where
not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing (emphasis in orig-
inal).
This section is further qualified by the so-called "publicity proviso" which is set forth infra
at note 33. Note that subsection (B) pertains to sections 8(b)(4)(i) and 8(b)(4)(ii).
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offered in Section V. Section VI examines the two different modes of
discourse the Labor Act and first amendment employ. It explores what
the first amendment's notion of individualism assumes about the in-
dividual and the activity of self-determination. It suggests ihat first
amendment discourse deflects attention from consideration of the con-
ditions that nurture the reflection and choice on which self-government
depends.
I. DEBARTOLO I THE TAFT-HARTLEY PROVISIONS AND THE RISE OF
A CONSTITUTIONAL PREDICAMENT
A. Factual Simplicity and Statutory Ambiguity
The procedural history of the DeBartolo case, prolix as it is, 23
reflects well the problematic nature of the Labor Act's Taft-Hartley
provisions. It somehow seems wholly appropriate that the case took
nearly a decade and two appearances before the Supreme Court to bring
to resolution-and that the underlying issues remain as tangled as ever.
Despite the years spent in appellate litigation before various tribunals,
the facts of the case are quite simple and straightforward, indeed so
much so that no hearing on them was ever held. The underlying record
consists only of a stipulation of facts with some attached exhibits,
which, upon the joint motion of the parties, was transferred from the
administrative law judge directly to the Board for its determination. 24
The facts of the case can be recited briefly. The H.M. Wilson
Company, the operator of a chain of department stores, leased land in
a shopping mall located in Tampa, Florida. The mall, of which Wilson's
was one of the larger tenants, was owned and managed by the DeBartolo
Corporation. To erect its building at the mall, Wilson retained the H.J.
High Construction Company. Though the building would become part
of the mall's structure, by the terms of its lease, Wilson had sole control
over the selection of the contractors who would erect it.25 High allegedly
was paying substandard wages and benefits to its unorganized em-
ployees who were engaged in the construction of the Wilson's building.
23. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades Council, 252 N.L.R.B. 702 (1980), afd sub
nom. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated and re-
manded, 463 U.S. 147 (1983) (DeBartolo 1) (holding that union's speech activities are not
protected by the publicity proviso of section 8(b)(4); remanded to consider question of coer-
cion under statute), 273 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1985) (supplemental decision and order; coercion
found), enforcement denied sub nom. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328 (11 th Cir. 1986), affd sub nom. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (DeBartolo II).
24. DeBartolo, 252 N.L.R.B. 702, 702 (1980).
25. Joint Appendix, Stipulation of Facts, at 23(a)-24(a), DeBartolo 1, 463 U.S. 147
(1983).
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In protest, agents of the union entered onto DeBartolo's property and
distributed handbills at the four public entrances to the mall. The con-
tent of these handbills, which did not refer to High by name, urged
consumers to refrain from patronizing stores located in the mall "until
the Mall's owner publicly promises that all construction at the Mall"
would henceforth be performed only by contractors paying prevailing
union wage and benefit rates.2 6 The distribution of the handbills was
peaceful and orderly, and was unaccompanied by picketing or patrol-
ling. The handbilling, which with notable timing was commenced in
mid-December, continued until enjoined by a state court decree issued
in early January.27 The only question before the Board in DeBartolo I
was whether the union's conduct in urging consumers to boycott the
mall and its tenants in furtherance of the union's primary dispute with
the H.J. High Construction Company constituted unlawful secondary
activity under the statute. Resolution of this question depended upon
the construction to be given section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Labor Act.28
26. The handbills read:
PLEASE DON'T SHOP AT EAST LAKE SQUARE MALL PLEASE.
The FLA. GULF COAST BUILDING TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO is, re-
questing that you do not shop at the stores in the East Lake Square Mall because
of The Mall ownership's contribution to substandard wages.
The Wilson's Department Store under construction on these premises is being
built by contractors who pay substandard wages and fringe benefits. In the past, the
Mall's owner, The Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation, has supported labor and our
local economy by insuring that the Mall and its stores be built by contractors who
pay fair wages and fringe benefits. Now, however, and for no apparent reason, the
Mall owners have taken a giant step backwards by permitting our standards to be
torn down. The payment of substandard wages not only diminishes the working
person's ability to purchase with earned, rather than borrowed, dollars, but it also
undercuts the wage standard of the entire community. Since low construction wages
at this time of inflation means decreased purchasing power, do the owners of East
Lake Mall intend to compensate for the decreased purchasing power of workers of
the community by encouraging the stores in East Lake Mall to cut their prices and
lower their profits?
CUT-RATE WAGES ARE NOT FAIR UNLESS MERCHANDISE PRICES
ARE ALSO CUT-RATE. We ask for your support in our protest against substandard
wages. Please do not patronize the stores in the East Lake Square Mall until the
Mall's owner publicly promises that all construction at the Mall will be done using
contractors who pay their employees fair wages and fringe benefits.
IF YOU MUST ENTER THE MALL TO DO BUSINESS, please express to
the store managers your concern over substandard wages and your support of our
efforts. We are appealing only to the public-the consumer. We are not seeking to
induce any person to cease work or to refuse to make deliveries.
DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. 568, 670 n.1.
27. DeBartolo, 252 N.L.R.B. at 703. Until the case reached the Fourth Circuit for
its review, none of the parties raised the interesting issue of whether the stranger handbillers
had a protected right to gain access to the mall property. At that point, the court refused to
entertain the question. Edward J. DeBartolo v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264, 272 (4th Cir. 1981).
The Board's current standards for non-employee access to an employer's property are set
forth in Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (Sept. 27, 1988), 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1201 (1988).
28. For the text of this section, see supra note 22.
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The so-called secondary boycott 29 prohibitions of the Labor Act,
among which the provisions of section 8(b)(4)(B) figure prominently,
can hardly be called a triumph of clear drafting. First enacted as a part
of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act, the language of the present section 8(b)(4)(B) was reformulated
and extended by the Landrum-Griffin Amendments of 1959.30 Ben-
jamin Aaron has described this section as "surely one of the most
labyrinthine provisions ever included" in a federal statute.3 Certainly,
it constitutes one of the most problematical, a quality enhanced in no
small degree by the fact that the language in which it is framed is very
different from that employed by the Labor Act's Wagner provisions.
The stated objective of the framers of section 8(b)(4) was the protection
of "neutral" employers and workers from disputes with which they are
"unconcerned. ' 32 Thus, the Board's task in construing and applying
the terms of this section has consisted of defining who, for its purposes,
constitutes a neutral party.
Specifically, the language of section 8(b)(4) pertinent to DeBartolo
provides that it is unlawful for a labor organization "to threaten, coerce,
or restrain any person engaged in commerce" when an object in so
doing is to compel "any person ... to cease doing business with any
other person." The purpose and reach of the language of section 8(b)(4)
29. Although long used judicially, the term "secondary boycott" is not used in the
Labor Act itself. As Judge Learned Hand instructed,
[t]he gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the em-
ployer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no
concern in it. Its aim is to compel him to stop business with the employer in the
hope that this will induce the employer to give into his employees' demands.
International Bhd. Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950). For
what is perhaps the classic exposition of this complex statute, see Lesnick, The Gravamen
of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1962).
30. For a concise explanation of these reformulations and extensions, see NLRB v.
Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 50-54 (1964); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehouse-
men, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 64-70 (1964); A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 642-44 (10th ed. 1986).
31. Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (pt. 2),
73 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1113 (1960). In their magisterial study of the amendments, Harry
Millis and Emily Brown similarly characterized the Taft-Hartley Act, stating that "[slince it
was complex, looked in two directions at once, and in addition was poorly drafted and unclear
at many points, it meant many things to many men." H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note
21, at 655.
32. "This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the
business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between an em-
ployer and his employees." 93 CONG. REC. 4323 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft). "[T]here
have been numerous jurisdictional disputes in which the employer is absolutely innocent,
and yet he and the public have been made to suffer, even though they have had absolutely
nothing to do with the controversy or the causes of it." 93 CONG. REC. 4416 (1947) (statement
of Sen. Smith). See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S.
212, 223 n.20 (1982) (purpose of section 8(b)(4)(B) to protect "neutral employers" as well as
preventing the "widening of industrial strife").
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is clarified and qualified by several provisos. Crucial to the issues raised
in DeBartolo was the construction to be given the so-called publicity
proviso. In it, Congress declared that nothing contained in the language
of section 8(b)(4)
shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing,
for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including
consumers and members of a labor organization, that a prod-
uct or products are produced by an employer with whom the
labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed
by another employer
unless that publicity induced the employees of a disinterested employer
to refuse to handle goods or perform services at the distributor's place
of business.33
B. Labor Board v. Servette: The Proviso Construed
A part of the Landrum-Griffin amendments to the Labor Act, the
publicity proviso received its first (and, until DeBartolo, only) con-
struction by the Court in 1964 in NLRB. v. Servette, Inc.34 Servette, a
wholesale distributor to supermarkets, was engaged in a dispute with
the union that represented the company's drivers. In furtherance of its
position, agents of the union went to various supermarkets which pur-
chased merchandise from Servette and distributed handbills to con-
sumers and passersby. The contents of the handbills described briefly
the union's reasons for striking and asked its readers to support the
drivers by refusing to purchase named items supplied to the stores by
Servette.35
33. The complete text of the publicity proviso reads:
Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained
in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for
the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of
a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with
whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another
employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual
employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his
employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform
any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution....
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
34. 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
35. The handbill read as follows:
"To the Patrons of This Store
"Wholesale Delivery Drivers & Salesmen's Local No. 848 urgently requests that
you do not buy the following products distributed by Servette, Inc.:
"Brach's Candy
"Servette Candy
"Good Season Salad Dressing
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Construing the publicity proviso as language of exception and ex-
clusion, the Court concluded that its terms protected the union's dis-
tribution of the handbills. 36 The Court thus upheld the NLRB's finding
that the union's activity did not contravene the prohibitions of sec-
ondary activities contained in section 8(b)(4). Specifically rejecting the
conclusion the Ninth Circuit had made upon its review of the case,3 7
the Court held that even though Servette did not "produce" the items
that it distributed, Servette nevertheless constituted a "producer"
within the meaning of the proviso.38 The proviso, the Court counseled,
"was the outgrowth of a profound Senate concern" that union speech
rights "be adequately safeguarded."' 39 To construe its terms so that the
proviso's protections "applied only in situations where the union's la-
bor dispute is with the manufacturer or processor," warned the Court,
"would fall far short of achieving this basic purpose."4 The Court
instructed that "the protection of the proviso" was not intended by
Congress "to be any narrower in coverage than the prohibition to which
it is an exception."' In short, after Servette, the legality of an otherwise
unlawful appeal turned on the answer to this question: Did the neutral
employer, whose customers were the objects of the union's appeals,
constitute a distributor of the products of the employer with whom the
union had its primary dispute? If so, the appeal was protected. Thus,
in applying the terms of the proviso, the NLRB's task lay in determining
what for its purposes constituted a producer-distributor relationship.
C. United Steelworkers of America (Pet, Inc.): The Proviso
Transformed
The complexities-and ambiguities-inherent in this assignment
are well-illustrated by the facts and rationale of the United Steelworkers
of America (Pet, Inc.) case, decided by the Board in 1979.42 There, a
"Old London Products
"The Servette Company which distributes these products refuses to negotiate
with the Union that represents its drivers. The Company is attempting to force the
drivers to sign individual 'Yellow Dog' contracts.
"These contracts will destroy the wages and working conditions that the drivers
now enjoy, and will set them back 20 years in their struggle for decent wages and
working conditions.
"The drivers of Servette appreciate your cooperation in this fight."
Id. at 48 n.2.
36. Id. at 55.
37. Servette, Inc. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1962) (setting aside the NLRB's
decision in 133 N.L.R.B. 1501 (1961)).
38. Servette, 377 U.S. at 55.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. United Steelworkers of Am. (Pet, Inc.), 244 N.L.R.B. 96 (1979), enforcement
denied sub nom. Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1981).
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union was involved in a strike against a division of the Hussmann
Refrigerator Company, which in turn was a wholly owned subsidiary
of Pet, Inc., a diversified conglomerate engaged in a broad variety of
businesses. As part of its strike against Hussmann, the union, through
handbills, newspaper advertisements and statements made by its offi-
cers during televised interviews, urged the public to support its mem-
bers by refusing to purchase products produced by or to trade with
stores operated-by Pet or any of its subsidiaries.43 Although the Board
found that Pet's divisions and subsidiaries operated "essentially as in-
dependent business entities," it concluded that the union's conduct fell
within the shelter of the proviso and thereby, even if coercive, was not
unlawful." As framed by the Board, determination of the protected
status of the union's activities turned on whether Hussmann consti-
tuted a "producer" of the products of Pet and its constituent companies
because of the "diversified corporate relationship" between them.45
In answering this question, the Board noted that in previous cases,
both it and the courts had construed broadly the statutory terms "prod-
ucts," "produced" and "distributed." This approach, the Board con-
tinued, was consistent with the Court's admonition in Servette that
Congress intended the shelter of the proviso to be no lesser in scope
than the prohibitions to which its language stands as an exception. The
Board further observed that, with judicial approval, it had construed
the statutory term "producer" to include "anyone who enhances the
economic value of the product ultimately sold or consumed, '46 thus
bringing within the proviso's reach the suppliers of services as well as
manufacturers and distributors.47 Read together, these cases made "ap-
43. These activities are described in detail in United Steelworkers of America (Pet,
Inc.), 244 N.L.R.B. at 99.
44. Id. at 97.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 101 (quoting American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists, San Fran-
cisco Local (Great W. Broadcasting Corp.), 150 N.L.R.B. 467, 472 (1964), enforced, 356 F.2d
434 (9th Cir. 1966).
47. In addition to Great Western Broadcasting, the Board relied upon its decision
in Local No. 662, Radio and Television Eng'rs (Middle-South Broadcasting Co.), 133 N.L.R.B.
1698 (1961). These two cases involved parallel variations on the facts of Servette. In both,
the Board had concluded that broadcasters add their "labor, in the form of capital, enterprise
or service" to the products or services of those employers who advertise through the broad-
caster's facilities. Middle-South Broadcasting, 133 N.L.R.B. at 1705; Great Western Broad-
casting, 150 N.L.R.B. at 472. Because it found that labor in the form of advertising enhances
the marketability of a product or service, the Board concluded that a broadcaster "becomes
a very important producer in the intermediate stage leading toward" the sale of that product
or service. Middle South Broadcasting, 133 N.L.R.B. at 1705. The Board thus ruled that
striking employees of a broadcaster do not offend the secondary boycott prohibitions by
directing consumer appeals against secondary employers who continue to advertise over the
struck station during the labor dispute. The secondary retailer or provider of services, it
concluded, constitutes a distributor of a product produced by the broadcaster; the consumer
appeal thereby falls within the shelter of the publicity proviso. The Board in Pet also noted
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parent" the conclusion that the proviso shields union appeals to the
customers of a neutral employer, made through means other than pick-
eting, "so long as the primary employer has at some stage produced,
in the sense of applying capital, enterprise or service, a product of the
neutral employer."4 8 The constituent operations of diversified business
organizations, the Board explained, provide support for and make con-
tributions to one another.49 While admitting that their respective con-
tributions may differ considerably, the Board reasoned that each sub-
sidiary operation supplies some measure of goodwill and "profits, either
actual or potential, which enhance the value of the enterprise" as a
whole.50 Because Hussmann made just such contributions to Pet's over-
all enterprise, the Board found that under the proviso, Hussmann con-
stituted a producer of the products of Pet and its subsidiaries. Con-
sequently, the Board dismissed the complaint against the union,
concluding that its actions were exempted from the proscriptions of
section 8(b)(4). 51
The rule announced in Pet may have been "apparent" to the Board.
It was not to the Eighth Circuit, which rejected the Board's interpre-
tation of the proviso as unreasonable and remanded the case for further
proceedings.52 To most readers, the most distinctive aspect of the
Board's decision is the strained and ephemeral quality of its reasoning.
In Pet, the Board analyzed only half of what precedent required in the
application of the proviso's terms. Thus, although the decision never
speaks to the point, Pet and its subsidiaries presumably constituted
"distributors" within the meaning of the proviso. Yet, unlike the pre-
vious cases on which the Board relied, 53 there were no identifiable
products or services which Hussmann had participated in manufac-
turing or distributing for another division of Pet. Nor had Hussmann
performed some specific services like advertising which made more
saleable the goods or services provided by the other divisions which
comprised Pet. Rather, Pet and its subsidiaries became distributors
that in its decision in International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 537 (Lohman Sales Co.), 132
N.L.R.B. 901 (1961), it had found that for the purposes of the proviso, "a product need not
be tangible, and that, since labor is the prime requisite of one who produces, an employer
who applies his labor in the form of'capital, enterprise and service' to a product, in the initial
or intermediate stages of marketing" constitutes a producer. Lohman, 244 N.L.R.B. at 100.
(Lohman and Servette involved identical fact patterns; in its opinion in Servette, the Court
specifically approved of the Board's conclusion in Lohman that, for the purposes of the
proviso, a wholesaler distributor constitutes a producer.).
48. Lohman, 244 N.L.R.B. at 101.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 102.
52. Pet, 641 F.2d 545, complaint dismissed, 288 N.L.R.B. No. 133 (May 31, 1988),
128 L.R.R.M. 1161 (1988) (finding case controlled by Court's opinion in DeBartolo Hi).
53. See supra note 47.
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because Hussmann, through its economic and organizational relation-
ships with them, had enhanced their value as enterprise organizations.
In short, after Pet, the determination under the proviso of an employer's
status as a neutral no longer turned on an examination of its relation-
ship to the primary through the chain of production. Instead, that de-
termination turned on whether the primary had enhanced the economic
status of the would-be secondary as an enterprise. The Pet decision
thus broke the analysis of the proviso from its old moorings established
by the Court in Servette. The words of the statute remained the same,
but the act of interpretation performed in Pet markedly transformed
their meaning.
Nevertheless, the outcome of PMt hardly seems outrageous.
Through its economic enhancement theory, the Board simply at-
tempted to recognize the economic and organizational interdependence
of affiliated business enterprises. To term the parent of a subsidiary an
uninterested party does seem to constitute the very erection of form
over substance that was condemned in Servette. To this extent, the
result in Pet is wholly consistent with the Servette Court's instruction.
Yet, as construed by the Court in Servette, the language of the proviso
stands as language of exception. The unintelligibly vague test the Board
formulated in Pet, however, seemingly admits of no stopping point.
Consequently, Pet threatened to do away with all restrictions on pub-
licity other than picketing. It was just this potential which the Board's
first decision in DeBartolo manifested, and which alarmed the Court
in DeBartolo L
The Pet case illustrates one of the fundamental problems under-
lying the attempts to outlaw "secondary" activities; the prohibitions
assume that it is possible in an integrated economy to isolate the impact
of any undertaking. Further, even a quick reading of the case also leaves
one with the impression that the wrong question has been asked, and
that there was something fundamentally amiss with the interpretive
framework used by both the Agency and the courts to analyze questions
under the proviso. The DeBartolo case would eventually confirm that
impression.
D. DeBartolo I: The Attempt to Restore Servette
The record in the DeBartolo I case reached the Board within
months of the issuance of the Pet decision.54 Interestingly, as part of
the parties' stipulations on that record, DeBartolo had agreed that, for
54. The Board's decision and order in Pet is dated August 10, 1979. Pet, 244 N.L.R.B.
at 96. On May 22, 1980, the Board issued an order granting the parties' motion to transfer
the DeBartolo proceeding to the Board for its determination. The Board issued its first decision
in the matter on September 30, 1980. DeBartolo, 252 N.L.R.B. at 702.
1990:149
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
the purposes of the proviso, Wilson's Department Store constituted a
distributor of the products of the High Construction Company."
Viewed against the analytical pattern established in the Board's pre-
Pet decisions, DeBartolo's stipulation seems reasonable enough.56 In
light of its analysis in the Pet case, however, the Board's recognition
of High's status as a producer apparently turned upon the idea that,
by constructing a new store building for Wilson's at DeBartolo's mall,
High was enhancing the value of the Wilson chain as a business en-
terprise. But why stop there? The implications of its analysis in Pet
were clear to the Board, and it vigorously pursued them.
A shopping mall and its tenants, the Board observed, are mutually
dependent for their economic success. 7 Consequently, like the divi-
55. Id. at 704.
56. See, e.g., International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 139 (Oak Constr.
Co.), 226 N.L.R.B. 759 (1976) (handbilling of telephone utility by union asking the public
to withhold portions of their monthly bills in furtherance of union's dispute with contractor
hired by the utility protected by proviso); Local Union No. 54, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l
Ass'n (Sakowitz, Inc.), 174 N.L.R.B. 362 (1969) (union's handbilling directed to customers
of two retail clothing stores that had both leased space in an uncompleted shopping center
in furtherance of union's dispute with air conditioning subcontractor hired by developer of
the center protected by proviso); Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 142 (Piggly Wiggly)
133 N.L.R.B. 307 (1961) (union's handbilling directed to customers of retail food store chain
in furtherance of their dispute with refrigeration subcontractor employed by chain, protected
by proviso). Like the DeBartolo case, each of the unions in Oak Construction, Sakowitz and
Piggly Wiggly were engaged in protesting the respective contractors payment of substandard
wages and benefits. Further, none of these cases discusses the nature of the primary employers'
(i.e., the contractors') "product" that was being "distributed" by the utility or retailer. Indeed,
though far from clear on the point, Sakowitz and Piggly Wiggly seem to suggest that consumer
handbilling simply is not subject to the prohibitions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). In fact, the
administrative law judge in the Piggly Wiggly case, Fannie M. Boyls, specifically so concluded.
Piggly Wiggly, 133 N.L.R.B. at 318-19. Her decision, which contained a masterful analysis
of the proviso's legislative history, thereby anticipated by over 25 years the subsequent opin-
ion in DeBartolo II.
Obviously, contrary rulings in Oak Construction, Sakowitz and Piggly Wiggly may
have resulted in construction workers having far more restricted communication freedoms
than those enjoyed by employees in other sectors of the economy, contrary to the Court's
instruction in Servette. Common to each of the above-cited Board decisions is the fact that
the employer subject to the handbilling had a direct business relationship with the contractor
whose employment policies the union found offensive. Thus, even though the distribution
of the work of persons engaged in the building trades becomes in these cases a wholly idealized
and formulaic notion, the existence of a producer-distributor relationship as a form of lim-
itation upon the scope of union communicative activities at least implicitly remained an
important aspect of the Board's application of the proviso.
57. The Board noted that each tenant in the mall paid a minimum rent which
automatically increased when a large department store commenced doing business, and that
each tenant was required to pay the proportionate costs of maintaining the mall's common
areas. All were also required to join and pay dues to a merchant's association which conducted
joint advertising campaigns. "A functioning Wilson's store," the Board stated, "will attract
consumers to the mall who will then' visit and purchase products from other tenants, and,
reciprocally, Wilson's will profit from its proximity to the other tenants." DeBartolo, 252
N.L.R.B. at 705. DeBartolo, the Board found, also stood to gain "for its leases provide that,
in addition to receiving monthly rents," it received a percentage of each tenant's gross sales.
Id.
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sions of a diversified corporation, DeBartolo and its lessees had a "sym-
biotic" relationship. 58 Although it admitted that High had no relation-
ship with DeBartolo, or any of its tenants but Wilson's, the Board found
that High was applying "its labor to a product, i.e. the Wilson's store,
from which DeBartolo and its tenants will derive substantial benefit."5 9
The Board thus concluded that, just as Hussmann could be said to
have "produced" the product of Pet, High, through its performance of
construction services for Wilson's, could be said to have applied "cap-
ital, enterprise and service" that would inure to the economic benefit
of DeBartolo and its tenants, and that would enhance the value of their
common enterprise.60 Since High stood as a "producer" both to
DeBartolo and to its tenants, the Board concluded that the handbilling
gained the protection of the proviso and was lawful. It thus dismissed
the complaint against the union in its entirety. Having so ruled, the
Board, consistent with its practice in previous cases, 6' made no findings
as to whether the union's actions constituted restraint or coercion
within the meaning of section 8(b)(4) of the Labor Act. In a footnote,
the Board also observed that, given its conclusion, it need not accept
the union's invitation to inquire into whether the union's conduct was
protected by the first amendment.62
If the length of a decision serves as any indicator, the Board, with
its reformulated version of the proviso in hand, had little trouble in
disposing of DeBartolo. Although the Fourth Circuit analyzed the mat-
ter in greater depth, it adopted the Board's reasoning and upheld its
conclusions. 63 The Supreme Court, however, in an opinion noteworthy
for its tentative and almost anxious tone, unanimously vacated the
Fourth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case to the Board.64 After
reciting the facts of the case, the Court observed that it had previously
interpreted the producer-distributor requirement of the proviso only
in Servette, an opinion confined solely to construing the term "pro-
ducer."'65 In contrast, the present case turned on the meaning of the
term "distributor" and what constituted a producer-distributor rela-
tionship. Noting that DeBartolo had been "willing to concede" that
Wilson constituted a "distributor" of High's products,66 the Court ob-
served that the Board had failed to make any finding "that any product
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. E.g., Pet, 244 N.L.R.B. at 100.
62. DeBartolo, 252 N.L.R.B. at 705 n.3.
63. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981) (Britt, J.,
dissenting).
64. DeBartolo 1, 463 U.S. 147 (1983).
65. Id. at 154-55.
66. Id. at 155-56.
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produced by High was being distributed by DeBartolo or any of Wil-
son's co-tenants." The only publicity exempted from the Labor Act's
secondary boycott prohibitions, the Court instructed, was that intended
to inform the public that the product of the primary employer was
being distributed by a third party. The Board's economic enhancement
theory, "would almost strip the distribution requirement of its limiting
effect."' 67 Such an approach was "so generous" that it would permit a
union to urge consumers to refrain from trading with "virtually any
secondary employer;" had Congress intended that all peaceful non-
picketing publicity be protected, the proviso "would not have contained
a distribution requirement., 68 Despite DeBartolo's stipulation to the
status of Wilson as a "distributor," the Board had "no justification for
treating the products that the co-tenants distribute to the public as
products produced by High ... .-"69 The Court thus held that the Board
had erred in concluding that the union's activities fell within the pro-
tection of the proviso.
E. Taft-Hartley, the First Amendment, and the Court's Quandry in
DeBartolo I
As it was plainly aware, the holding in DeBartolo I placed the
Court in a predicament, the nature and the extent of which can only
be appreciated in light of the Court's previous treatment of conflicts
between the statute and the first amendment. A consistent theme of
the previous cases was the Court's recognition that labor legislation
represents an especially sensitive subject of congressional activity. 0
Accordingly, the Court resolutely had upheld both the Labor Act's
Wagner and Taft-Hartley provisions against all first amendment chal-
lenges. The manner in which it had done so, and the distinct pattern
of departure from prevailing first amendment doctrine in cases in-
volving the Taft-Hartley provisions, is well exemplified by the Court's
opinion in International Longshoremen's Assn. v. Allied Int'l, Inc. 7 In
this case, members of the Longshoremen's union refused to unload
cargo from Russian ships or to handle Russian goods at ports on the
67. Id. at 156.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 157.
70. On the distinctive quality of labor law generally, see Lord Wedderburn, Labour
Law: Autonomy from the Common Law?, 9 CoMP. LAB. LAW J. 219 (1988) and sources cited
therein. Other useful sources discussing this topic include, M.A. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY
AND THE NEW PROPERTY 143-70 (1981); P. SELZNICK, LAW SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUS-
TICE 121-54 (1969); H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 103-06, 112-17, 120-
21 (1968); Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character ofAmerican Labor Laws, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1394 (1971).
71. 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
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East and Gulf coasts to protest the Russian invasion of Afghanistan
and the Carter Administration's "business as usual" trade policy with
the Soviet government.72 The business of Allied, an importer of Rus-
sian wood products, was interrupted by this protest. Allied alleged that
the union's protest had forced it to "cease doing business" with the
carrier of Allied's imported goods from Soviet ports and with the stev-
edoring company the carrier employed. Allied charged, and the Board
agreed, that the Longshoremen's protest constituted an illegal secondary
boycott under the terms of section 8(b)(4).7 3
On review, the Court acknowledged that the union's protest was
purely political, had no labor relations objectives, and had not been
intended to halt dealings between Allied and any other business.7 4
Nonetheless, the Court upheld the conclusion that the activity was
unlawful. However "commendable" the union's objectives might have
been, the Court opined, the union's action would have the "certain
effect" of imposing "a heavy burden on neutral employers."-75 The
congressional purpose behind the enactment of the boycott prohibitions
was to shield neutrals from such burdens and to prevent the spread of
industrial strife. 76 Thus, whenever such union activity "reasonably can
be expected to threaten" a neutral party with substantial economic loss,
it necessarily has the unlawful object of coercing them.77
Through reasoning that amounted to no more than a mere ipse
dixit, the Court also rejected the union's claim that its activity was
protected by the first amendment. Writing for a unanimous Court,
72. The Longshoremen's statement announcing the boycott read:
In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file members of the Union,
the leadership of ILA today ordered immediate suspension in handling all Russian
ships and all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine to Texas and Puerto Rico where
ILA workers are employed.
This order is effective across the board on all vessels and all cargoes. Grain and
other foods as well as high valued general freight. However, any Russian ship now
in process of loading or discharging at a waterfront will be worked until completion.
The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international events
that have affected relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
However, the decision by the Union leadership was made necessary by the
demands of the workers.
It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian cargoes under
present conditions in the world.
People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual policy as
long as the Russians insist on being international bully boys. It is a decision in which
the Union leadership concurs.
Id. at 212 n.1.
73. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 799 (Allied Int'l, Inc.), 257 N.L.R.B.
1075 (1981).
74. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 456 U.S. at 222-23.
75. Id. at 223.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 224 (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447
U.S. 607, 614 (1980)).
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Justice Powell simply stated that "[aipplication of§ 8(b)(4) to the ILA's
activity in this case will not infringe upon the First Amendment rights
of the ILA and its members."7 8 Although there was no picketing activity
involved in Allied, the Court further noted that it had consistently
rejected the claim that "secondary picketing by labor unions in vio-
lation of section 8(b)(4) is protected" under the first amendment. 79 The
Court closed its brief consideration of the constitutional issues by ob-
serving that the union and its members had "many ways" to express
their opposition to foreign policy "without infringing upon the rights
of others." 80
The extent to which the Court has been willing to protect the Labor
Act's Taft-Hartley provisions from even the hint of unconstitutionality
becomes even more clear when the Allied opinion is compared to the
Court's opinion in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.81 In Claiborne,
the Court held that a boycott of white-owned businesses to effect
changes in local governmental policies constituted protected expression
under the terms of the first amendment. 82 It thus reversed a state court's
holding that the NAACP and the individual organizers of the boycott
could be liable to the boycotted businesses on the basis of the common
law tort of malicious interference with the respondent's businesses.8 3
The Court acknowledged that "the petitioners certainly foresaw-
and directly intended-that the merchants would sustain economic in-
jury as a result of' the boycott.8 4 Even though the boycott might have
had "a disruptive effect on local economic conditions,"85 the Court
78. Id. at 226.
79. Id. The Court followed this statement with the remarkable and revealing sug-
gestion that the Longshoremen's conduct was "designed not to communicate, but to coerce."
Id.
80. Id. at 227.
81. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). Tellingly enough, Claiborne was handed down within weeks
of Allied.
82. Among the boycotters' specific demands were "the desegregation of all public
schools and public facilities, the hiring of black policemen, public improvements in black
residential areas, selection of blacks for jury duty, integration of bus stations so that blacks
could use all facilities, and an end to verbal abuse by law enforcement officers." Id. at 899.
83. 393 So. 2d 1290 (Miss. 1980). Because it found that the boycott had been en-
forced in part by violence and threats, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that the
boycott was not protected by the first amendment. The Mississippi Supreme Court stated:
If any of these factors-force, violence, or threats-is present, then the boycott is
illegal regardless of whether it is primary, secondary, economical, political, social
or other. All of these factors are here present, and the boycott was illegally operated
and we do not need to examine into its type, whether primary or other.
Id. at 1301 (quoted in part at Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 895). The Mississippi Supreme Court
declined to find that the boycott violated the state's secondary boycott statute only because
the statute was enacted two years after the boycott commenced. Id. at 1300-01.
Upon its review of Claiborne, the U.S. Supreme Court held that all nonviolent aspects
of the boycotters' activities were protected by the first amendment. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at
915.
84. Id. at 914.
85. Id. at 912.
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held that it was not subject to state regulation because the boycotters'
goal was "to bring about political, social and economic change" for
themselves.86 The Court observed that
[w]hile States have broad power to regulate economic activity,
we do not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful political
activity such as that found in the boycott in this case. This
Court has recognized that expression on public issues "has
always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values." 87
Only two facts distinguish Allied from Claiborne. The first is the
existence of the terms of the Labor Act. In Claiborne, the Court stated
that "[s]econdary boycotts and picketing by labor unions may be pro-
hibited, as part of 'Congress' striking of the delicate balance between
union freedom of expression and the ability of neutral employers, em-
ployees, and consumers to remain free from coerced participation in
industrial strife.' "88 The Court explained that restrictions on such com-
municative activity was justified by "the strong governmental interest
in certain forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation
may have an incidental effect on rights of speech and association." 89
The second difference is the identity of the speaker in Allied, and the
Court's views about the proper range of activities in which a union
legally may be involved. As the Allied Court saw it, the "random po-
litical objective" of the Longshoremen's boycott was objectionable and
hence beyond the coverage of the first amendment because it was "far
removed from what has traditionally been thought to be the realm of
legitimate union activity." 9° In other words, wages and hours, not po-
litical protests, are the proper concern of unions.91
Precedents like Allied and Claiborne seemed strongly to suggest
that the union in the DeBartolo case bore little chance of convincing
the Court that the application of section 8(b)(4) to its handbilling ac-
tivities raised constitutional difficulties. The Court, however, seemed
eager to avoid yet another exercise in attempting to accommodate the
Labor Act's terms to first amendment doctrine. Noting that the Board
had yet to decide whether the handbilling itself constituted unlawful
86. Id. at 911.
87. Id. at 913 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
88. Id. at 912 (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in result)). The Court also cited the Allied
case for this proposition.
89. Claiborne, at 912.
90. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, 456 U.S. at 226 (quoting
Longshoremen v. Allied Int'l, 640 F.2d 1368, 1378 (1st Cir. 1981)).
91. For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 194-212 and accompanying
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coercion or restraint within the Labor Act's terms, the Court declined
to consider the constitutional issue and remanded the case to the Board
to consider the statutory question. 92
A prudential doctrine of long-standing is that courts should not
pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case may be disposed
of on another ground.9 3 The doctrine is rooted in the concern that the
judiciary demonstrate a proper deference to the legislature. The Court's
invocation of the doctrine in DeBartolo, however, smacks more of
expedience than of concern over the separation of powers. To hold
against the union on the first amendment issue would have highlighted
once again that labor is somehow less deserving of protections for its
speech than other organizations and associations, though for reasons
that never have been stated clearly. To hold for the union would have
had the explosive potential of questioning the constitutional legitimacy
of much of the structure of the 1947 and 1959 amendments to the
Wagner Act. One can hardly blame the Court for looking elsewhere for
resolution of the issues DeBartolo raised.
F. The Case on Remand: The Board and the Eleventh Circuit in
DeBartolo II
Although the Court purported not to have decided the statutory
issue, given the Court's reasoning in the matter, the Board had little
choice on remand but to conclude that the union's distribution of hand-
bills at DeBartolo's mall constituted coercive conduct in violation of
the Labor Act. 94 Specifically, the Board found that the union's distri-
bution of the handbills had the unlawful object of seeking to force the
mall's tenants to cease doing business with DeBartolo, thereby com-
pelling either or both DeBartolo and Wilson to suspend their dealings
with High. This conduct, the Board concluded, constituted coercion of
the mall's tenants within the meaning of section 8(b)(4) and was thereby
unlawful. 95 The Board once again declined to consider the union's
contention that the first amendment protects handbilling. The Board
modestly explained that "as a congressionally created administrative
agency" it would "presume the constitutionality of the Act" it admin-
istered. 96 The Court's hope to avoid the constitutional issue appeared
to have been thwarted. Either Servette would have to be reformulated,
which would require overruling the just-issued DeBartolo I opinion, or
the apparent clash of the Board's application of the statute with the
first amendment would have to be reconciled.
92. DeBartolo 1, 463 U.S. 147, 157-58 (1983).
93. See, e.g., DeBartolo 11, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
94. The decision on remand is reported at 273 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1985).
95. Id. at 1432.
96. Id. For a concise review of the Board's fluctuating willingness to entertain con-
stitutional claims, see Communication Workers of America v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641, 2647
(1988).
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The Eleventh Circuit's masterful opinion in DeBartolo I19' spared
its reluctant superior from having to resolve this dilemma. The opinion
is a textbook example of the proper use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation. It demonstrates that the tortuous language of the proviso
had not been intended by Congress to be language of exception at all.
Rather, the proviso had been intended as language of clarification. 98
Its placement in subsections 8(b)(4)(i)(B) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was to show
that the restrictions of secondary consumer appeals were directed solely
at picketing; other forms of union publicity were not prohibited. 99 The
97. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328
(I Ith Cir. 1986) (DeBartolo If).
98. Id. at 1343.
99. Id. How this point became forgotten provides a revealing view of the way in
which statutes come to gain their meanings. Prior to the Court's Servette decision, the meaning
of the publicity proviso's language seemed to be understood clearly enough. As Benjamin
Aaron observed in his extensive analysis of the Labor Act's Landrum-Griffin amendments
(which he published in 1960), the language of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
in the unqualified form in which it first appeared in the Landrum-Griffin bill could
have been interpreted as overruling previous decisions upholding a union's right to
organize a consumer boycott of a store selling the products of a manufacturer with
whom the union has a labor dispute. The House conferees insisted, however, that
the new provision was intended to do no more than outlaw picketing which caused
a secondary consumer boycott. Accordingly, they agreed to insert another of the
innumerable provisos that disfigure the new law, the effect of which was to permit
a union to employ every other form of publicity except picketing for the purpose
of inducing consumers to boycott either the product of the primary employer or the
distributor who does business with him.
Aaron, supra note 31, at 1114 (footnotes omitted). As noted at supra note 56, in an early
decision that preceded the Board's construction of its language, Administrative Law Judge
Fannie Boyls also construed the proviso as language of clarification and concluded that the
restrictions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) were directed solely to consumer appeals made by pick-
eting.
The notion that the proviso should be construed as language of exception, and that it
contained a distribution requirement seems largely to have sprung from NLRB Member
Rodgers' partial dissent in the Board's Lohman decision (supra note 47). The administrative
law judge in Lohman construed section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to apply only to picketing. He thus
concluded that the union's handbilling of the customers of Lohman, a wholesale distributor
of candy and tobacco products, in furtherance of the union's dispute with Lohman constituted
no violation of the Act. In his partial dissent, Member Rodgers disagreed with this reading
of the Labor Act, stating
I think it is clear that Congress unmistakably limited the application of the 8(b)(4)
proviso to the presence of certain requirements or expressed conditions; and unless
all of the enumerated conditions are met in every respect, the proviso cannot be
relied upon to save what would otherwise be unlawful. One of the conditions spec-
ified in the proviso is the publicity must involve "a product or products ... pro-
duced" by an employer with whom there is a primary dispute, and which "are
distributed by another employer." Here Lohman, the primary employer, concededly
produces nothing; on the contrary, it distributes the products which are produced
by others. Accordingly, by its explicit language the proviso cannot stand as a defense,
and consequently Respondent's handbilling should be declared unlawful.
Lohman, 132 N.L.R.B. at 910-11 (footnote omitted). The Board's majority responded at
length to Member Rodger's contentions. They first noted that by its terms, the "proviso to
Section 8(b)(4) protects 'publicity, other than picketing' " (Id. at 904) (emphasis in original),
and "that mere handbilling is not picketing but is embraced by the term 'publicity' which is
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court explained that the producer-distributor language of the proviso
reflected the fact that the only type of non-picketing consumer appeal
that had been discussed during the congressional deliberations was
"secondary union action taken against a retail store selling a struck
manufacturer's product."' l0 As the legislative history reveals, the sup-
porters of the language presently contained in section 8(b)(4) included
the publicity proviso "both to clarify their position that nonpicketing
publicity was not prohibited and, most importantly, to allay the fears
of the opponents of the amendments that such speech would be re-
stricted."'0° Because it was unable to find that Congress in framing the
boycott prohibitions had intended to proscribe the peaceful distribution
of handbills, the court concluded that no violation of the Labor Act
had occurred.
At least one unstated consequence of the holding immediately was
obvious. Since the misconstruction of the proviso in Servette, both the
Board and the courts had struggled mightily to answer the wrong ques-
tion. Whether a union's appeal to customers might constitute secondary
activity turns on the manner in which the union makes that appeal. It
does not turn on determining whether the employer, whose customers
are the objects of the union's appeal, is a "producer" or "distributor."
Little wonder the language of the proviso had seemed so prolix, or that
the reasoning of the cases attempting to apply its terms were so often
byzantine. Because the Supreme Court, for substantially the same rea-
sons, adopted the Eleventh Circuit's view as to the meaning of the
proviso, it is necessary to consider the implications of this holding and
what, in its wake, are the questions yet to be resolved.
protected by the proviso" (Id. at 905). The Board's majority then turned to Member Rodgers'
contention that because Lohman was a wholesaler, it was not a producer for the Labor Act's
purposes, and concluded that "there is not the slightest reason to conclude that Congress was
concerned with permitting truthful publicity with respect to products derived from manu-
facturers," but not with publicity regarding products from wholesalers like Lohman (Id. at
908). In so responding to his argument, as Member Rodgers himself noted in his partial
dissent, the Board had agreed that the proviso constitutes language of exception. Member
Rodgers might have added that the majority had also agreed that the proviso contained a
distribution requirement. Subsequent events seem almost inexorable: In its Servette decision,
the Board majority simply relied on its recently issued Lohman decision. In turn, on its
review of Servette, the Supreme Court, without reference to the legislative history and without
much analysis, approved the Board's majority's inclusion of wholesalers within the proviso's
term "producer." Thus was created the problem that took a quarter-century and the Court's
DeBartolo I decision to resolve.
Unfortunately, this is not an isolated incident: the distinction between "decision" and
"effects" bargaining, which is central to the Court's opinion in First National Maintenance
v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), arose out of a similar sort of circumstances. See Kohler,
Distinctions Without Differences: Effects Bargaining in Light of First National Maintenance,
5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 402, 405-13 (1983).
100. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F.2d at 1341
(emphasis deleted) (DeBartolo II).
101. Id.
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II. THE TAFT-HARTLEY SPEECH RESTRICTIONS AFTER DEBAR TOLO
H: STATUTORY SOLUTION WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONAL RESOLUTION
The Court's DeBartolo II opinion is of undoubted importance both
to the administration of the Labor Act and to first amendment juris-
prudence generally. Its holding undoes a generation's worth of mis-
understandings. It jettisons the tortured logic and the express, as well
as implied, limitations on certain types of union communicative ac-
tivity fashioned by a body of case law that employed a faulty premise
to interpret and apply an important provision of the nation's basic
labor relations statute. Though relatively brief, the DeBartolo II opinion
does much to clarify the speech rights of a labor organization under
the terms of the National Labor Relations Act. Given the case's prec-
edents, it establishes these rights in a comparatively expansive per-
spective. Indeed, the opinion even contains the tantalizing suggestion
that communication about labor relations matters may be extended
the full protection of the first amendment.1" 2 While the Court specif-
ically left open the possibility that some union messages may be "of
the commercial speech variety and thereby entitled to a lesser degree
of constitutional protection," it nevertheless strongly hinted that the
handbilling involved in DeBartolo, though calling "attention to a spe-
cific situation," was of the highest constitutional dignity. 10 3
DeBartolo II thus raises the possibility that the long eroded doc-
trine of Thornhill v. Alabama'1 might in part be reinvigorated. The
1940 Thornhill opinion represents the point of apogee in the first
amendment protection extended to the speech activities of employee
associations. There, the Court struck down as unconstitutional on its
face a state statute that made it a crime to engage in picketing to further
a boycott. "In the circumstances of our times," the Court declared, "the
dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute
must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed
by the Constitution."'0 5 The Court continued its discussion, stating
that
The health of the present generation and of those as yet un-
born may depend upon these matters, and the practices in a
single factory may have economic repercussions upon a whole
region and affect widespread systems of marketing .... Free
discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the
102. DeBartolo HI, 485 U.S. at 575-76. Presumably, however, only communication
about labor relations matters made by means other than picketing and not directed to a
neutral employer's employees will be entitled to first amendment protection.
103. Id. at 576.
104. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). For a description of Thornhill's steady decline, see Getman,
supra note 4, at 12-16.
105. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 102 (citing Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939), and
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 155, 162-63 (1939)).
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causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the
effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular gov-
ernment to shape the destiny of modem industrial society. 106
The Thornhill opinion, with its statements about the importance of
labor speech to the maintenance of a healthy democracy, is especially
striking when compared to more recent opinions like Allied.,0 7 Of
course, any full-scale resurrection of Thornhill in the near future is
remote. The case's flat-footed extension of first amendment protection
to the peaceful dissemination by any means of information concerning
a labor dispute would call into question many of the strictures of section
8(b)(4). DeBartolo H may signal some renewed appreciation by the
Court of the importance of speech concerning the employment rela-
tionship, and more generally the contributions to the public discourse
made by labor organizations. Given the contrary view of the long line
of cases between Thornhill and DeBartolo II, however, it seems unwise
to read too much into the silvery but slim dicta of one case.
Whatever changes in the law DeBartolo H may work, the opinion
cannot dispel the effects that result from twenty-five years of construing
and applying the statute as if it constituted a flat ban on all so-called
union secondary communicative activity, save that sheltered by the
proviso. Neither can the opinion erase the implicit and frequently re-
peated message that the speech of labor organizations is of lesser dignity
and subject to greater state regulation than the speech of other asso-
ciations. 10 8 Though the influence of the law may be neither as strong
nor as pervasive as the influence of language, law also plays a consti-
tutive role in a society. It acts as a sort of flexible social template. The
law announces duties and defines their limits. It serves as an important
device for ordering our relations with one another. It creates-and can
limit-one's expectations. Thus, law performs communicative and pe-
dagogical functions as well.109 Of course, law is hardly the only insti-
tution in society that exerts such effects. As de Tocqueville observed,
106. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 103.
107. It is also interesting to compare the Thornhill Court's language with Edmund
Burke's characterization of community (see infra text accompanying notes 149-53) and with
Gunther Teubner's conception of collective bargaining as a "reflexive" system of private
ordering (see infra text accompanying notes 127-29).
108. For some further comparisons of the Court's treatment of unions vis-d-vis other
organizations, see Cox, The Supreme Court-Foreward: Freedom of Expression in the Burger
Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33-39 (1980); Getman, supra note 4; Pope, supra note 4; Note,
Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free
Speech, supra note 4; Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First Amendment, supra note
4.
109. On these and other functions meaning performs, see B. LONERGAN, METHOD
IN THEOLOGY 76-81 (1972); Lonergan, Existenz and Aggiornamento, in COLLECTION: PAPERS
BY BERNARD LONERGAN 222 (F. Crowe & R. Doran 2d ed. 1988); B. Lonergan, Dimensions
of Meaning, in id. at 232.
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however, law has an especially strong constitutive influence for Amer-
icans. " 0 Law and especially constitutional law has become the central
repository of our values and, as such, acts as a prime carrier and trans-
mitter of meaning. In our pluralistic society, it has become the one
source of those ideas and principles upon which (at least at an unre-
flective, emotional level) we generally agree, and through which we see
our society as distinctly American. I ' The actual impact of the long
treatment of "labor" speech as different, without a comprehensive, or
comprehensible, explanation other than the identity of the speaker, is
as incalculable as the lesson of Roe v. Wade"2 that abortion is a fun-
damental right guaranteed to all women. In both instances, the message
has been influential in molding the views of the populace who live
under the law's instruction and guidance. Of course, fewer members
of the general public have read a case like Allied, for instance, than
even that small number who have read Roe. The influence of statute
or case law rarely is direct. The message is inculcated through numerous
informal channels. Clients receive instruction from their lawyers. News-
letters alert managers, unionists and others as to the latest rulings and
what they "mean" for the readers' interests. The news media report
stories about unions being enjoined from or paying damages for pick-
eting or boycotting activity found to violate federal law. These means
of instruction may be petty, but because of their pervasiveness and
constancy, they are effective.
To the extent possible, DeBartolo II does restate the law, and the
law's message, as Congress apparently originally intended it. Thus, the
opinion makes clear that section 8(b)(4) does not proscribe peaceful
appeals by unions made to the public by means other than picketing.
In effect, DeBartolo I and that portion of Servette which interpreted
the publicity proviso as language of exception have been overruled sub
110. De Tocqueville's account and analysis of American democracy is a complex
and interwoven one. The role of law is a constant theme of his account, particularly in his
first volume. As he there states, "[tihe main object of this book has been to make American
laws known." A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 286 (J.P. Mayer ed. 1969).
Despite the emphasis he places on law, however, de Tocqueville ultimately does not regard
its influence as primary:
A great part of the success of democratic government must be attributed to these
good American laws, but I do not think that they are the main cause. While I think
that they have more influence on American social happiness even than the nature
of the country, I still have reasons for thinking that mores are even more important.
Id. at 307. De Tocqueville defines mores as "the habits of the heart," and the "different
notions possessed by men, the various opinions current among them, and the sum of ideas
that shape mental habits." The term covers "the whole moral and intellectual state of a
people." Id. at 287.
111. For two recent, nuanced accounts of this influence, see S. LEVINSON, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL FAITH (1988) and M. KAMMEN, SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL
DISCOURSE IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1988).
112. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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silentio. To encapsulate its holding, DeBartolo II essentially restates
the proviso to read that nothing contained in paragraph 8(b)(4) "shall
be construed to prohibit publicity directed to members of the public
other than picketing" or to state it just slightly differently, "forms of
publicity directed to the public other than picketing are not prohibited"
by the terms of the section. It is appropriate here to consider more
specifically what in light of the holding of DeBartolo II remains re-
stricted by section 8(b)(4), and what exceeds its prohibitions.
Perhaps the best way into this task is through a brief statutory
excursion. Section 8(b)(4), it should be remembered, contains two sub-
sections.113 The provisions of section 8(b)(4)(i)(B)-which were not at
issue in DeBartolo-forbid a labor organization "to induce or encour-
age" individuals employed by a neutral employer "to withhold their
services in order to force their employer to cease dealing with" the
party with whom the union has its primary dispute. As has been seen,
the provisions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibit a labor organization
from engaging in conduct designed "to coerce or constrain" an indi-
vidual where the union's object is secondary. Its terms also make un-
lawful the threat to engage in conduct prohibited by either subsection.
Though a bit of a caricature, taken-together, these provisions essentially
restrict union appeals to different audiences. Thus, subsection (i) ba-
sically prohibits appeals to the employees of "uninterested" employers,
while subsection (ii) is directed at restraining certain appeals made to
members of the public.
From the standpoint of the Labor Act's administration, all that
DeBartolo II does is to make clear that non-picketing appeals directed
to members of the public are outside the scope of the Labor Act and
therefore cannot constitute restraint or coercion for the purposes of
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Accordingly, the "threat" to undertake such ex-
cluded appeals is similarly beyond the reach of the statute. As noted,
DeBartolo II also seems to indicate that the legality of such appeals
henceforth shall be measured under the first amendment, though the
degree of protection to be afforded has yet to be determined. The opin-
ion goes no further. Hence, the remainder of section 8(b)(4)'s restric-
tions are unimpaired, as are the holdings of the cases authoritatively
construing and applying their terms. Can it be that the case that seems
to do so much has the potential to do so little? 114
113. The provisions of section 8(b)(4) are set forth supra at note 22.
114. Not to be overlooked in the evaluation of the impact of DeBartolo IH is the
question of union access to an employer's property. While a union may not violate the Labor
Act's secondary boycott restrictions by activity such as handbilling, a union's ability to gain
access to an employer's property to make its dispute known is hardly absolute. See Jean
Country, 291 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (Sept. 27, 1988), 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1201 (1988).
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Freeing labor organizations and their members to pursue at least
most forms of public appeals is hardly insignificant. Nevertheless,
DeBartolo II leaves in its wake a great deal of unfinished business. The
case, after all, involved a question of statutory interpretation and pro-
ceeded at a sub-constitutional level. Although pregnant with suggestion,
it based none of its holdings on the first amendment. Thus, while it
may foreshadow much, from the standpoint of constitutional doctrine,
the case settles nothing definitely. The intersection of the Labor Act's
terms with the first amendment remains as uncertain as ever; the grand
synthesis has yet to be performed.
Divination is a notoriously risky business. Yet, it would be wholly
in keeping with the Court's consistently maintained policy of deference
to the Labor Act's terms if it were to confine the impact of DeBartolo
II to its facts. This is not to suggest that such an outcome is to be
desired. It is not. The restrictions upon union communicative activities
imposed by section 8(b)(4) have resulted in unions enjoying far fewer
speech protections than other forms of associations. Thus, as Archibald
Cox has written, of the various types of speech upon which the Court
has found restrictions permissible, "peaceful labor picketing is the most
important, and also the most difficult to fit into a coherent body of first
amendment law." '"15 In light of the DeBartolo II Court's view that
"picketing is qualitatively 'different from other modes of communi-
cation,' "116 the demise of the "speech plus" approach" 7 to labor pick-
eting seems unlikely, at least in the near term. Typically, the Court in
DeBartolo II does not explain the qualitative difference that separates
picketing from other sorts of communicative activity. Instead, it cites
to earlier opinions in which it has made the same statement." 18
115. Cox, supra note 108, at 36.
116. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. 568, 580 (1988) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Work-
ers, 442 U.S. 289, 311 n.17, (1979) (quoting Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465
(1950))).
117. Foi some time, the Court has distinguished between "pure speech" and com-
municative conduct. Because picketing includes elements in addition to speech, and "is a
mixture of conduct and communication," the Court has held that restrictions may be placed
on picketing that would not be permitted on pure speech. See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees, 447 U.S. 607, 618-19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in result);
Florida Gulf Coast Bld'g & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328, 1332-34 (1 lth
Cir. 1986) (DeBartolo II). For a well-known critique of the speech-conduct distinction, see
Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REv. 1.
118. See cases cited supra note 116. The Hughes Court in turn relied upon a char-
acterization made of picketing by Justice Douglas in his concurrence in Bakery & Pastry
Drivers & Helpers, Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942), in which he stated,
"[p]icketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a
particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind
or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated." For
two critiques of this vague but influential statement, see Getman, supra note 4, at 13-15;
Cox, supra note 108, at 36-39.
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Also unlikely to fall by virtue of the Court's ruling are any of the
restrictions contained in section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) that forbid speech by
which a union may seek "to induce or encourage" the employees of a
secondary employer to withhold their services where the communi-
cation has a secondary object. As the Allied case demonstrates, it takes
very little to establish such an unlawful object. Contrary to prevailing
first amendment doctrine in other settings, even the potential economic
impact of union communication on a third party seems to be sufficient
to make out a violation and to remove the communication, whether
made symbolically or otherwise, from constitutional protection. 119 This
result raises constitutional questions every bit as troubling as those
produced by the Board's prohibition of handbilling in DeBartolo II.
A comparison of the reach of subsections (i) and (ii) of section
8(b)(4) gives some further illustration of the tensions between the first
amendment and the Taft-Hartley provisions that DeBartolo II left un-
resolved. As the law now stands, union members may make non-pick-
eting appeals urging the employees of an "uninterested" business to
support the union by withholding their patronage from their employer.
However, section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) prohibits the unionists from urging those
employees to support the union by withholding their services from their
employer. In brief, urging listeners not to shop is permissible, but urging
them not to work is forbidden. From a first amendment perspective,
little distinguishes these two appeals. Assume that in both instances
the appeals were made through peacefully distributed handbills, and
that no picketing or patrolling was involved. Further assume that, as
in DeBartolo, the handbills contained no threats, and "pressed the ben-
efits of unionism to the community and the dangers of inadequate
wages to the economy and the standard of living of the populace."' 120
In both instances, the employees are the audience to whom the
union's message is directed; the "secondary employer vis-d-vis the
handbill is a non-listener."'' Moreover, the claim that speech is in-
119. Compare International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, 456 U.S. 212, 226
(1982) ("It would seem even clearer that conduct designed not to communicate but to coerce
merits still less consideration under the First Amendment" than secondary picketing) with
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982), and Organization for a Better Austin
v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) ("The claim that the expressions were intended to exercise
a coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach of the First Amend-
ment.").
120. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 576. The Court indicated that these characteristics of
the Union's message contained in the handbills made it more than "typical commercial
speech." It further observed that "however these handbills are to be classified," restrictions
upon their distribution would raise serious constitutional issues." Id.
121. DeBartolo 11, 796 F.2d at 1335. Hence, the Eleventh Circuit concluded in
DeBartolo H that "a finding of statutory coercion would not control the First Amendment
analysis," because "[w]hile the focus of§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is coercion of the secondary employer,
the secondary employer vis-d-vis the hand bill is a non-listener." Id. For the purposes of
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tended ultimately to exercise a coercive impact upon someone does
not remove that speech from the reach of the first amendment. 12 2 Fur-
ther, assuming that they are not public employees, the audience to
whom the handbills are directed commit no illegality by withholding
their work. 123 Nevertheless, in the second instance described above,
the union's communication is prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(i)(B). A
showing of restraint or coercion is not a necessary element to making
out a claim of section 8(b)(4)(i)(B). Nor is it necessary to make out a
claim that the communication constitutes a "threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit" to the audience of employees to whom it is
directed.
The prohibitions of section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) constitute a content-based
restriction on speech. In non-labor first amendment cas*es, the Court
has held that, to survive constitutional muster, content-based restric-
tions must be shown both to advance a compelling state interest and
not be more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.1 24 The
compelling interest in restricting union speech, while referred to in cases
like Claiborne, has never been identified clearly. Moreover, the restric-
tions on labor speech are certainly broader than those the Court has
countenanced in other settings.
Cox is correct: The restrictions on union communicative activity
that the Labor Act imposes are incompatible with prevailing first
amendment doctrine. Nothing in the DeBartolo II opinion resolves the
fundamental tension that exists between these statutory prohibitions
and the first amendment. But, these restrictions hardly represent the
full extent of the Labor Act's inconsistencies with first amendment
notions and values. The statute is shot through with them. The Wagner
Act provisions are as problematic from a first amendment perspective
as the statute's Taft-Hartley provisions. While DeBartolo II well rep-
resents the way the Court has handled first amendment challenges to
the statute's Taft-Hartley provisions, the Court's approach becomes
intelligible only through an examination of the factors that ground the
tension between the Labor Act's Wagner provisions and the first
amendment. Such an examination explains both the way the Court
treats labor cases with first amendment implications, and the reasons
it has deferred to a statute so patently inconsistent with first amendment
doctrines. More significantly, this examination reveals the way our first
assessing the first amendment protections to which the handbills would be entitled, the focus
must be on the consumers, the audience to whom the message is directed. Id. (citing NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969)).
122. Id. at 1335 (citing Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 911; Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419 (1971)).
123. However, if they are bound by a no-strike pledge, they may lose their protections
under section 7 of the Labor Act and be liable to discipline or discharge, and their union,
depending on the circumstances, may be liable for contractual damages.
124. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
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amendment discourse has taught us to think about the nature of as-
sociation.
III. THE WAGNER PROVISIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: MODES
OF DISCOURSE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
A. The Wagner Act's Scheme and the Role of the
Employee Association
One reason that the Court has encountered such difficulty in com-
ing to grips with first amendment challenges to the National Labor
Relations Act is that the entire scheme of the statute is constitutionally
problematic. The Wagner Act portion of the statute, however, presents
first amendment difficulties of a different character than the statute's
Taft-Hartley provisions. In the Wagner Act, Congress adopted a flexible
scheme for the private ordering of the employment relationship. 125
Founded upon the formation of self-organized and autonomous em-
ployee associations, collective bargaining leaves it to the parties to dis-
cuss, determine and administer the law that will govern the employ-
ment relationship. 126 Collective bargaining represents an example of
what Gunther Teubner has characterized as a "reflexive" legal scheme.
The goal of reflexive law, Teubner suggests, is "regulated autonomy"
or controlled self-regulation. 27 Reflexive schemes of ordering regular-
ize and give state sanction to institutions which allow ordering to occur
from the "bottom-up" by the parties directly involved. 128 In a reflexive
legal scheme, government does not dictate or directly influence the
outcomes of decisions made within the state sanctioned institutions.
Instead, it relies on market mechanisms to shape them. Consequently,
reflexive legal schemes entail a minimal degree of state intervention in
the ordering of such basic social relationships as the relation of em-
ployment. 129
125. Congress did not "invent" collective bargaining. Instead, through the Wagner
Act, Congress adopted a scheme whose characteristics and practices had been shaped jointly
over time by workers and employers. Like the law merchant, labor law developed from the
"bottom-up," not the "top-down."
126. In our scheme of "free" collective bargaining, the relative economic strength of
the parties, and not the government, is to determine the outcomes of the parties' negotiations.
On the collective bargaining model and the Wagner Acts scheme, see Kohler, supra note 11,
at 513-34.
127. See Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAw &
Soc. REV. 239 (1983).
128. In more Weberian terminology, reflexive law institutes formally rational pro-
cedural and organizational norms that give regularized structure to and integrate participation
within social decision-making institutions.
129. The recognition of employment as a relationship is long-standing. See, e.g., A.
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 169-70
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.The freely formed, autonomous employee association is the heart
of the collective bargaining scheme. Consequently, it is not surprising
that the principal thrust of the Wagner Act is the removal of impedi-
ments to employee self-association. The employee association-the
union-performs several roles. It acts to mediate the relationship be-
tween the individual and the entity that employs her. In a setting in
which one's job typically is both one's primary form of wealth and
determinant of social status, the union also serves to reduce the indi-
vidual's vulnerability. Likewise, it affords individuals an immediate
means to take part in framing and adjusting the law that most directly
affects their daily circumstances and conditions. 130 The social insti-
tution of collective bargaining thus constitutes a method for self-de-
termination. In J. Willard Hurst's words, it represents a means through
self-association "to mobilize group power in behalf of individual sta-
tus."1
31
As will be discussed more fully below, 132 the significance of the
employee association and the practice of collective bargaining far tran-
scends the local workplace or a narrow concern with its benefits and
compensation policies (though these are themselves hardly insubstan-
tial matters). For'the moment, however, it is important to keep in mind
the value the Wagner Act places on association, since this represents
the point at which first amendment doctrine and the Wagner Act di-
verge.
As first amendment doctrine has developed over the course of this
century, it increasingly has emphasized individual autonomy. A large
part of the operation (and hence the meaning) of first amendment law
consists in insulating individuals from various norms and restrictions
settled upon by the community. As a result, first amendment doctrine
often acts to shelter individuals from claims of associational obligation
or responsibility. In contrast, the Labor Act's Wagner provisions seek
to protect the individual and his status by defending associations and
their claims. In the Wagner Act's scheme, the association exists for the
individual, and supplies the means to enhance individual status and
the potential for self-determination. The ends intended by the first
(A. Skinner ed. 1974) (observing the mutual dependence of employer and employed). Sim-
ilarly, in his Commentaries, Blackstone states that master and servant, parent and child, and
husband and wife constitute "the three great relations in private life." 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *422. In this observation, Blackstone seems to be echoing Aristotle in The
Politics, who finds in these relations the basis for political life. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 38
(C. Lord trans. 1985) (Bk. I, ch. 3, 1253b 1-6).
130. For a fuller explication of this point, see Feller, A General Theory ofthe Collective
Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 720-36 (1973).
131. J.W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY UNITED STATES 86 (1956).
132. See infra text accompnaying notes 222-49.
1990:149
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
amendment and the Wagner Act are not inconsistent. Both intend to
intensify and nurture the potential of the individual for self-determi-
nation. The courses of these two bodies of law, however, essentially
are incongruous. Ultimately, they rest on two very different views of
what it means to be a human being. These views, and the nature of
association they portray, are reflected in the different languages the first
amendment and the Wagner Act employ.
B. The Roots and Lessons of Our First Amendment Discourse
Language has been described as expressed meaning and, like law,
it acts as a carrier of shared or common meanings. Consequently, like
law, our language performs a constitutive function. We live in and
through it. Language, including our legal language, mediates the world
to us. Language gives us structure and orients us within the natural
and social realms we inhabit. It provides a didactic vehicle by which
we define our roles, communicate our duties and expectations, and
announce and inculcate our judgments of value. Consequently, lan-
guage serves as a primary means by which we fix and specify our com-
mon understandings and shared meanings. It forms the foundation for
community.
Every language has its makers-poets, philosophers, politicians,
journalists or advertisement writers-who give terms new meanings, or
transform or invent new categories in which we think and speak. What-
ever else their differences, those thinkers who have most influenced
and shaped the language in which we conduct our first amendment
discourse typically have regarded associations with deep suspicion. As
they view them, associations threaten both the individual and the state.
Thomas Hobbes, for example, described associations as "wormes in
the entrayles of a natural man."' 33 Rousseau, Hobbes' greatest critic,
agreed with him, at least on this point. Rousseau warned that "for the
general will to be well expressed," it is "important that there be no
partial society in the State, and that each citizen give only his opinion"
(i.e., allow it to be formed by the representative of the general will-
the state). 1 34 Where the extirpation of "partial societies" proves im-
possible, Rousseau counseled that "their number must be multiplied
and their inequality prevented."' 35 In The Federalist Papers, Madison
carefully followed Rousseau's advice in propounding his prescriptions
133. T. HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 375 (C.B. Macpherson ed. 1981).
134. J.-J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 61 (R. Masters trans. 1978) (Bk. II,
ch. III).
135. Id.
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for what he termed the "dangerous vice" of "factions."' 136 Similarly,
in the highly influential thought of John Locke, there is precious little
room for associations save in the form of the state itself, which in its
limited scope and arrangements becomes the only form of association
for which the human has a perdurable need. 137
True to the thought of its makers, the language that informs our
first amendment discourse has taught us to regard freedom as a form
of monadic or ontologic individualism. This view strips the individual
out of society and, at its limit, equates liberty with the absence of society
altogether. It suggests ultimately that self-isolation is the solution to
political questions and the proper means by which to preserve true
human freedom. Its starting point is that the human being and the
rights which are naturally hers exist outside any social context, are
grounded in the individual as an abstract, universalized monad, and
that the human is a self-enlightening, self-perfecting and morally com-
plete being who can find truth-if there is any to be found-unaided
and without the mediation of any community. In all respects then, the
individual is viewed as sovereign. Consequently, only that authority
to which the individual has given her uncoerced express or tacit consent
legitimately has power over her. 138
Notions about groups, organizations, community and the char-
acteristics of human association generally are tied directly to our ideas
of the meaning of personhood. Since our language conveys the view
that persons are selves apart from and prior to any sort of relation with
others, it has invited us to regard human association in terms of alli-
ances that come into existence solely to satisfy the self-directed wants
of their otherwise unrelated members. 39 These wants tend to be re-
duced to two categories: a desire for companionship (to enable self-
fulfillment and expression) and the desire for economic or political
power. Affiliations in turn are characterized respectively by the ends
that brought them about as expressive or purposive association. Be-
136. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
137. See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1689-90). On the enor-
mous influence of Locke's thought, including its continuing influence on American law, see
Pangle's magisterial study: T. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM (1988).
138. Thus, the right to emigrate, and in part, the right to travel: by remaining in the
state, one tacitly consents to its arrangements. But, with the individual seen as being onto-
logically prior to all institutions, to be restricted from leaving any group is regarded as
immoral.
139. On the manner in which Americans have conceived of the nature of groups,
association and like notions, see Wilson Carey McWilliams' monumental work, W. MC-
WILLIAMS, THE IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN AMERICA (1973) (especially useful in terms of the
present paper is McWilliams' discussion at 1-94 and 537-69). Also see Aviam Soifer's in-
sightful articles, Soifer, Freedom of Association: Indian Tribes, Workers, and Communal
Ghosts, 48 MD. L. REV. 350 (1989); Soifer, Toward A Generalized Notion of the Right to
Form or Join an Association: An Essay for Tom Emerson, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 641
(1988).,
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cause any form of affiliation or association can impinge or restrict
individual sovereignty, all are seen as having but limited authority over
their members, which is no more than that which the individual, im-
plicitly or explicitly, has ceded voluntarily. Consistent with the way we
speak about personhood, associations typically are understood as some
kind of limited liability organizations, 4 0 formed by otherwise unrelated
individuals whose limited affiliation has been brought about by, and
restricted to, some shared self-interest. In short, human association is
essentially artificial, instrumental and temporary in character.
The expression and consequences of these notions are displayed
in the Court's opinions dealing with union affiliation and membership,
but they are hardly confined there. The Court's recent opinion in Rob-
erts v. United States Jaycees41 presents a compelling instance of their
manifestation. In Roberts, the Court rejected the Jaycees first amend-
ment challenge to the application of a state civil rights law that forbade
the organization from excluding women from membership. In the
course of its opinion, the Court discussed the nature of association. It
observed that certain forms of "personal affiliations," such as marriage
and other "family relationships," have been extended a high degree of
first amendment protection against state interference. 42 This protec-
tion "reflects the realization" that it is through such "personal affilia-
tions" that one gains "the ability independently to define one's iden-
tity." 14 3 This protection also recognizes that "individuals draw much
of their emotional enrichment" from such "affiliations." 144 The Court
further described "family relationships" as typified "by such attributes
as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin
and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects
of the relationship."' 145 In other words, even marriage and kinship are
conceived of as potentially transient alliances between self-interested,
independent contractors, which have little connection with, or impact
upon, surrounding institutions. Given the extent of his influence on
our first amendment discourse, it is not surprising that the Court's
description of the family closely parallels those of John Locke. 146
Of course, there are associations and then there are associations.
Although our first amendment discourse works hard to distinguish
among them, it tends to blur the distinctions, and ends up by treating
all associations as if they simply constitute variations on a theme. In
Roberts, for example, two factors primarily served to distinguish the
140. The term is from McWilliams; see W. MCWILLIAMS, supra note 139, at 89.
141. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
142. Id. at 618-20.
143. Id. at 619.
144. Id. Thus, the family consitutes a form of expressive association.
145. Id. at 619-20.
146. See J. LOCKE, supra note 137, at 78-83.
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family from the "large business enterprise" or a civic group like the
Jaycees. One was the difference in their respective sizes.147 The other
was the greater degree of "selectivity" that individuals exercise in de-
ciding with whom to begin and remain in a familial relation. 148
A different and more nuanced view of the character and function
of association-which in turn expresses a notion of personhood distinct
from that conveyed by present first amendment discourse-is set forth
by Edmund Burke. Writing in the latter part of the 18th century, Burke
stands as a preeminent critic of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and similar
"modern" thinkers whose work has shaped and informed first amend-
ment discourse. Evoking the views of the writers of classical political
philosophy, Burke insisted that the human being could not be under-
stood properly except as situated in society and its history. To attempt
to understand personhood otherwise would lead to a distorted image
of the human being. Likewise, to employ the "moderns'" understand-
ing of the nature of the person and association as a guide for establishing
ordering arrangements would put the conditions for a flourishing hu-
man existence at grave risk. "To be attached to the subdivision, to love
the little platoon we belong to in society," Burke asserts in his familiar
claim "is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections.
It is the first link in the series by which we proceed toward a love to
our country and to mankind." 149 In criticizing the views that have come
to inform current first amendment discourse, Burke warns that it is a
mistake to speak of all associations as if they constitute "nothing better
than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico,
tobacco, or some other low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary
interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties."' 150 Certainly
there exist "subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional in-
terest." 5' But society, and the various associations in which it actually
exists, only can be comprehended when understood as constituting
more than "a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal
existence of a temporary and perishable nature. " 152 Taken as a whole,
these "little platoons," these intermediate associations, are society,
which itself is
a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a part-
nership in every virtue and in all perfection. As the ends of
147. The Court's model of family apparently is the nuclear family, and more spe-
cifically, the spousal relation, as opposed to the extended family and its relationships.
148. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620-22.
149. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 53 (T. Mahoney ed.
1983).
150. Id. at I10.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations,
it becomes a partnership not only between those who are
living, but between those who are living, those who are dead,
and those who are to be born. 53
For Burke, humans are not capable of being understood as isolated
monads, to be studied as if they existed in some idealized sphere. In-
stead, we as humans are intelligible only as we are situated associa-
tionally, in relation to a community. Communities and associations,
in turn, are more than the sum of their parts. Indeed, in a very real
way, we live not only as a community in time, but in a community
that transcends time. For Burke, association does not threaten our
humanity, but grounds it and sets the conditions for self-rule. The
language in which Burke speaks of the character of association (and
thereby, of the meaning of personhood) is evocative of a discourse now
little employed in law, especially at the constitutional level. This dis-
course is closely related to what Robert Bellah and his colleagues have
described as America's "second language," in contrast to our first which
they characterize as being framed and conducted in the now more
familiar terms of individualism. 154 The practices and habits of thought
that Congress adopted through the Wagner Act are reflective of this
second language. Significantly, it is not the language of our first amend-
ment discourse. Little wonder that the task of accommodating the Act's
Wagner provisions to the first amendment has proved such a troubling
exercise.
C. The Grounds of the Tension within the
National Labor Relations Act
The differences their discourses reflect explain why the efforts to
reconcile the Wagner Act to first amendment doctrine have failed. Dif-
ferences in language and the meanings those languages express also
explains the discord that exists within the National Labor Relations
Act and reveals why the statute stands as a house divided. Like first
amendment doctrine, the Labor Act's Taft-Hartley provisions are
framed in an individualistic language that views association suspectly.
153. Id.
154. HABITS, supra note 12, at 20-22, 155-57, 334-35. The term "association" is
especially problematic and the varying notions to which the term has been applied are the
subjects of a vast literature. Bellah and his colleagues use the term community to refer to "a
group of people who are socially interdependent, who participate together in discussion and
decision making, and who share certain practices ... that both define the community and
are nurtured by it." Id. at 333 (emphasis in original). Practices "are shared activities that are
not undertaken as a means to an end but are ethically good in themselves (thus close to
praxis in Aristotle's sense)." Id. at 335 (emphasis in original). As with any definition, this
one is heuristic and represents a sort of "ideal type" or notion. Bellah's definition of com-
munity suggests the characteristics that distinguish an association, as the term will be used
in this Article, from other sorts of social organizations.
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The amendments embody a set of policies and understandings that are
essentially inconsistent with the ideas that inform the Labor Act's Wag-
ner provisions.
The provisions of the Taft-Hartley amendments are couched in
terms of individual rights and simple economic regulation. The ra-
tionale for the amendments, their backers explained, was to protect
neutral employees and employers from disputes not their own. In ap-
praising the meanings and intentions of the Taft-Hartley amendments,
however, one point should be kept in mind. The Taft-Hartley amend-
ments represent the culmination of over a decade's worth of efforts in
Congress to modify, cabin, undercut or rescind the Wagner Act. 55 The
bill eventually enacted was the direct descendent of these earlier efforts
and consequently, many of its terms bear their stamp. Unable to
achieve the Wagner Act's outright repeal, the authors of the Taft-Har-
tley amendments engrafted onto the statute provisions that embodied
a "new and substantially different labor policy."' 156 This policy em-
phasized individual autonomy and distrusted the view that "concerted
activity" through autonomous employee associations was "the means
to effective protection of the rights of individuals." 157 Commentators
Harry Millis and Emily Brown noted that "rather than accepting col-
lective bargaining as in the main to be desired as essential in a healthy
society," many of the provisions of Taft-Hartley "inevitably had the
effect of weakening unions" and the processes of private ordering that
collective bargaining affords.' 58 While observing that some of the pro-
visions remedied abuses and filled gaps in the existing legislation, Millis
and Brown concluded that "too much of the Act shows that it was the
product of men who did not know how things work in industry or in
the administration of the NLRA, and of some who wished to weaken
the position of all labor organizations in the economic and political
scene." 159 A comparison of Allied with Claiborne or numerous other
cases involving the speech rights of corporations, civic groups or other
non-labor associations demonstrates the accuracy of this early but pres-
cient assessment of Taft-Hartley's tendencies.160
155. From 1937 (the year in which the Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), found the Wagner Act constitutional) to the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act in 1947, Millis and Brown found that there were over 230 bills introduced in
the Congress whose contents attempted to change the labor policy adopted in the Wagner
Act. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 21, at 333.
156. Id. at 482.
157. Id. at 665.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Such an exercise also brings to mind Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 814 (1961), in which he termed "pre-
Victorian" the notion that economic and speech rights are separable.
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A comparison of the statute's Wagner and Taft-Hartley provisions
reveals why, taken as a whole, the National Labor Relations Act is so
ungainly. It also explains why so many of the doctrines developed from
the statute appear to work at cross-purposes. Such a comparison also
elucidates the reason that the Labor Act's Taft-Hartley and Wagner
provisions present different first amendment problems. The Labor Act's
Taft-Hartley provisions are rooted in the same individualistic per-
spectives expressed in first amendment doctrine. Both bodies of law
distrust association. The tension between them arises over the restric-
tions on the speech of employee associations that the Taft-Hartley
amendments impose. The tension between the first amendment and
the Labor Act's Wagner provisions lies at a more profound level of
meaning that reflects different understandings about human nature,
reason and the function of association.
Since this Article has examined the expression of the constitutional
problems raised by the statute's Taft-Hartley provisions, it is appro-
priate here to undertake a complementary investigation of these matters
as they are posed by the Labor Act's Wagner section. The tensions
between the Wagner Act and the first amendment are most clearly
presented in a series of cases dealing with so-called union-security ar-
rangements.
IV. THE COURT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE WAGNER ACT:
THE LANGUAGE OF INDIVIDUALISM AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE
STATUTORY SCHEME
A. The Emblems of the Tension: The Exclusivity Principle and
Union Security Agreements
The employee association represents the primary tension between
the Wagner Act and the first amendment. Consistent with the value
the Wagner Act places on association, a central feature of its provisions
is the exclusivity principle. 16 1 The exclusivity principle rests on the
notion of majority rule. Accordingly, the exclusivity principle estab-
lishes the association formed by a majority of the employees as the
161. This principle is set forth in section 9(a) of the Labor Act (29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1982)), which provides that
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment....
Section 8(a)(5) of the Labor Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982)) makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9(a)."
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representative of all. It bars dissidents from forming alternative orga-
nizations to represent their interests separately.' 62
Although the exclusivity doctrine might be regarded as posing sub-
stantial restrictions on individuals' freedom to associate, it never has
been subjected directly to constitutional challenge. A closely-related
matter, however, the agency-shop, has come under the Court's exam-
ination several times. 163 Under agency-shop or union-security arrange-
ments, every employee in the workplace who is represented by the
union must pay, as a condition of continued employment, a service
fee equal in amount to the dues paid by the members of the union.
The purpose of these arrangements is to protect and financially main-
tain the majority-designated association. Agency-shop schemes, the
Court has observed, constitute "a significant impingement on First
Amendment rights."' 64 Their provisions require dissenting employees
"to support financially an organization with whose principles and de-
mands [they] may disagree." 1 65 "To be required to help finance the
union might well be thought," the Court has observed, "to interfere in
some way with an employee's freedom to associate for the advancement
of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit."' 16 6 Nevertheless,
the Court consistently has upheld such schemes in the face of the con-
stitutional challenges made to them.
In the Wagner Act, Congress made specific provision for so-called
"union-shop" agreements by which membership in the majority-des-
ignated employee association could be required as a condition of em-
ployment. 67 The Taft-Hartley amendments modified the Labor Act's
language to make it clear that the "membership" that could be required
under such union-security arrangements was limited to a requirement
that employees "tender the periodic dues and the initiation fee uni-
formly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining member-
ship." 68 In construing this amended language, the Court held that
162. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420
U.S. 50 (1975); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
163. Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988); Ellis v.
Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Railway Employes' Dep't
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
164. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 455.
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977)).
167. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1982)). Union shop arrangements were a typical feature of the practices of col-
lective bargaining that Congress subsequently adopted in the Wagner Act. For a concise
history and explanation of security agreements, see R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 639-43 (1976).
168. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 140 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982)). Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act (29 U.S.C. § 163(b)
(1982)) permits states, through so-called "right-to-work" legislation, to outlaw the use of union
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Congress had intended to permit an employer and a union to eliminate
the problem of the "free rider," that is, a person who enjoys the benefits
of the association's work, but makes no contribution toward them.1 69
The Court further ruled, however, that no one could be compelled to
assume actual membership in a labor organization. "'Membership, as
a condition of employment," it stated, "is whittled down to its financial
core." 1
7 0
B. Union Security Agreements and the First Amendment: Resolving
the Tension, Dissolving the Association
The Court first dealt with the constitutionality of union (or agency)
shop provisions in the 1956 case of Railway Employees Department v.
Hanson. 17' The case arose under the terms of section 2 Eleventh,172 of
the Railway Labor Act. 173 This section, which authorized the main-
tenance of union shop clauses, has been held to be substantially anal-
ogous to the terms of the National Labor Relations Act.' 74 In a brief
opinion, the Hanson Court rejected the first amendment claim that
shop schemes force dissidents "into ideological and political associa-
tions which violate their right to freedom of conscience, freedom of
association, and freedom of thought .... ,1 75 The adoption of an ar-
rangement that requires the "financial support of the collective-bar-
gaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work," the Court
held, was within the power of Congress under the commerce clause. 176
The choice of the union-shop "as a stabilizing force" was an "allowable
one."' 177 The Hanson Court specifically left open the breadth of activ-
ities to which nonmembers or dissenters could be compelled to con-
tribute consistent with the first amendment.
The constitutionality of the use of agency-shop fees for union po-
litical activities is an issue of particular sensitivity. The Court delib-
erately sidestepped the resolution of this issue in its 1961 opinion in
Machinists v. Street.' 78 There, a state court had found that some of the
security agreements. On the impact and policies of Taft-Hartley on union security arrange-
ments, see R. GORMAN, supra note 167, at 639-43; H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 21,
at 430-40, 635-37.
169. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
170. Id. at 742.
171. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
172. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
173. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
174. Communications Workers v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641, 2648-49 (1988) (citing Ellis
v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 452 n.13 (1984)).
175. Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 236 (1988).
176. Id. at 238.
177. Id. at 233.
178. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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monies collected under union-shop provisions sanctioned by the Rail-
way Labor Act were being applied to political uses to which a group
of employees objected. The state court concluded that, to the extent
the Railway Labor Act permitted the use of agency-shop fees for such
purposes, its terms violated the first amendment rights of the objecting
employees.' 79 The Supreme Court reversed, relying on the familiar
canon of statutory interpretation that acts of Congress are to be con-
strued so as to avoid doubt of their constitutionality. 8 ° The Railway
Labor Act's union-shop provisions, the Court stated, were intended by
Congress to eliminate the "free-rider" problem. 18 1 The use of funds
collected pursuant to such agreements for political purposes does not
help to defray costs associated with contract negotiation or adminis-
tration; hence, it "falls clearly outside the reasons advanced by the
unions and accepted by Congress why authority to make union-shop
agreements was justified."' 182 The Court thus held that the Railway
Labor Act must be construed to deny to unions the authority to use
union-shop fees to support political causes to which an employee ob-
jects.
The distinction in Hanson between a union's political and collec-
tive bargaining (ordering) activities 183 set the stage for the Court's opin-
ion in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 84 in which it faced squarely
the issue it had avoided in Hanson and Street. The result was a pre-
dictable application of the principles the Court had fashioned in the
latter opinions, and a good reflection of the influence of the ontologic
individualism expressed in first amendment discourse.
At issue in Abood was the validity of an agency-shop fee clause in
the collective bargaining agreement between a teacher's union and a
city's board of education. The clause, specifically permitted by the
state's public employee labor relations act,' 85 was challenged on first
179. The state courts' findings and holdings are recounted at Street, 367 U.S. at 744-
46.
180. Id. at 749.
181. Id. at 761.
182. Id. at 768. In his dissent in Street, Justice Frankfurter sternly criticized the
majority's holding. "The hearings and the debates lend not the slightest support" to the
construction the majority placed on the language at issue. As the majority construed it, the
amendment "would restrict the uses to which union funds had, at the time of the union-
shop amendment, been conventionally put." The absence in the legislative history "of any
showing of concern about unions' expenditures in 'political' areas only buttresses the con-
clusion that Congress intended to leave unions free to do that which unions had been and
were doing." Id. at 802 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter also noted that the
Labor Act contained specific safeguards for minority rights.
183. In his dissent in Street, Justice Frankfurter denounced this distinction as illusory
and warned that the Court "would stray beyond its powers were it to erect" such a distinction.
Id. at 812.
184. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
185, The statute is set forth id. at 212 n.1.
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and fourteenth amendment grounds by a number of teachers who al-
leged that it impermissibly deprived them of their freedom of associ-
ation. The teachers, nonunion members, objected to collective bar-
gaining in the public sector and to the union's expenditure of agency-
shop fees for political purposes.
In Abood, the Court discussed and reaffirmed its holding in Han-
son, as elaborated in Street: "such interference as exists" with one's
first amendment rights because of an agency-fee arrangement, "is con-
stitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important
contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations estab-
lished by Congress."' 86 The Court then observed that the state statute
in question was modeled broadly after the labor relations scheme
adopted by the National Labor Relations and Railway Labor acts. It
concluded that the governmental interests in labor peace and stability
of bargaining relationships in the public and private sectors were
equal. 187 Declining to distinguish between the two sectors for the pur-
poses of determining the first amendment rights of employees, the
Court concluded that Hanson and Street were controlling insofar as the
agency fees were applied toward costs associated with the union's bar-
gaining and contract administration activities. '88
The Court then raised its construction of the Railway Labor Act
in Street to the level of a constitutional principle. It held that the use
of service fees (collected under an agency-shop arrangement between
a governmental employer and the union) for political or ideological
purposes unrelated to bargaining and if objected to by an employee,
constituted a violation of that employee's first and fourteenth amend-
ment rights. 189 The Court frankly admitted that its holding would lead
to "difficult problems in drawing lines between" ordering and political
activities, but stated that it had no occasion on the record before it to
attempt to define this distinction. 90 The Court since has taken up the
problems of delineation in its recent opinions in Ellis v. Railway
Clerks,191 which arose under the terms of the Railway Labor Act, and
in Communications Workers v. Beck,192 which in essence extends Ellis
to situations arising under the National Labor Relations Act. In Ellis,
186. Id. at 222.
187. Id. at 223-24.
188. Id. at 224-26.
189. Id. at 232-37.
190. Id. at 236.
191. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
192. 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988). The Beck Court compared the proviso to section 8(a)(3)
of the National Labor Relations Act (which permits union security agreements) to section
2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act. It concluded that the language of section 8(a)(3) and
of section 2, Eleventh, were parallel in their purpose and structure. Consequently, the Court
held that the principles of Street and Ellis controlled the interpretation of the proviso to
section 8(a)(3).
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the Court ruled that expenses for the union's convention, social activ-
ities, and publications were sufficiently related to bargaining activities
to permit them to be underwritten by agency fee proceeds. However,
expenses for litigation were insufficiently related unless the litigation
involved matters arising out of organizing efforts, 193 grievance and ar-
bitration handling, or negotiations. 194
The agency-shop cases represent well the approach the Court has
employed toward cases involving conflicts between the Labor Act's
Wagner provisions and first amendment doctrine. In them, the Court
has rebuffed all invitations to find the agency-shop provisions uncon-
stitutional, but in so doing it has ever increasingly treated the employee
association as a sort of limited liability organization. The Court treats
the association-the union-as a threat to individual sovereignty. Since
certain individuals themselves have not recognized the authority or the
legitimacy of the association formed by their fellows, the opinions have
confined the validly sanctionable purposes of the association strictly
to activities concerned with enhancing the economic security of em-
ployees at the workplace itself. The union, thus, is spoken about and
presented simply as an affiliation of otherwise unrelated individuals
whose conjoining results from the accident of their employment with
the same entity and for whom improvement of their individual eco-
nomic position is the binding and delimited "interest."
C. The Language of Individualism and the Court's Foreshortened
Views of Unions and the Institution of Collective Bargaining
In the agency-shop cases, the Court has attempted to distinguish
between a union's ordering and political activities. By this means, the
Court has attempted to resolve the tension between a statute whose
goal is to protect individuals through defending and fostering their
association, and a first amendment discourse that can comprehend only
the individual. The influence of the language of individualism, how-
ever, is pervasive and manifests itself in cases well beyond those in-
volving union-shop issues. For example, the vision of the union as a
limited liability organization was an important factor in the Court's
holding in the Allied case. At issue in Allied, it should be remembered,
was not a challenge posed by dissidents to the association itself, but
the legality of a concededly political protest to which the members of
the association had agreed. Ignoring the history of the American union
movement, 95 the Court found the union's conduct objectionable be-
193. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448-51.
194. Id. at 453.
195. For a quick overview of the nature and extent of the involvement of unions in
"political" questions, see Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,
812-16 (1961).
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cause, in its view, such protests were "far removed from what has
traditionally been thought to be the realm of legitimate union activ-
ity."' 96 The Court apparently confined this realm to matters of com-
pensation and the hours of work necessary to obtain it.
A similarly foreshortened view of unions and of collective bar-
gaining is expressed in the Court's opinion in NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co.197 There the Court upheld against first amendment challenge the
Board's long-standing interpretation of the Labor Act f6 permit regu-
lation of employer speech during the course of an employee organizing
campaign. Such governmentally imposed restrictions are permissible,
the Court explained, because "what is basically at stake [in these sit-
uations] is the establishment of a nonpermanent, limited relationship
between the employer, his economically dependent employee and his
union agent, not the election of legislators or the enactment of legis-
lation whereby that relationship is ultimately defined."' 19 8 As the Gissel
Court portrays it, unions represent a typical example of purposive as-
sociation-just as in Roberts, the family represented a paradigmatic
example of expressive association. 99 Otherwise unrelated individuals
affiliate themselves into a union for one, limited end: to increase their
incomes. This economic self-interest bounds the purpose of the union
as an institution and represents the limits of its social significance. Like
any association, a union constitutes nothing more than a transient
alliance.2 0 However, Gissel can be seen as a "pro-bargaining" opinion.
After all, it upheld a Labor Board practice that was perceived widely
as protecting employee rights to organize.20' Nevertheless, the Court's
196. Longshoremen v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226 (1982). It is interesting to
compare this statement with one made by the Court in its opinion in First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). In Bellotti, the Court struck down on first amendment
grounds a state statute that prohibited certain types of corporations from expending funds
to influence votes on referendum proposals that did not affect materially the business, property
or assets of those corporations. In so ruling, the Court stated that "[i]f a legislature may direct
business corporations to 'stick to business,' it also may limit other corporations-religious,
charitable, or civic-to their respective business when addressing the public. Such power in
government to channel the expression of views is unacceptable under the First Amendment."
Id. at 785 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). The Bellotti Court based its holding largely
on the need of the public to hear.
197. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
198. Id. at 617-18.
199. On the Roberts case (discussing the nature of the family and association in
general), and on the notions of expressive and purposive association, see supra text accom-
panying notes 130-38.
200. On the idea of unions as "communities of memory," see infra text accompanying
notes 245-47. See also Burke's characterization of association, supra text accompanying notes
149-53.
201. For a major empirical study that questions the assumptions on which Gissel
and the regulation of election speech rests, see J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN,
UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY (1976). For a further critique of
Gissel and its policies, see Getman, supra note 4.
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characterization of bargaining is both revealing and unsettling. Only a
decade before, in its landmark Steelworkers Trilogy,202 the Court had
described the collective bargaining agreement as "more than a contract;
it is a generalized code."20 3 The Court also depicted collective bar-
gaining as "an effort to erect a system of industrial self-government"
through which the parties' relationship may be "governed by an agreed-
upon rule of law" which the parties would mutually promulgate and
administer.20 4 In less than ten years, collective bargaining had gone
from being spoken of as a system for self-governance to being an in-
stitution of limited social significance that had nothing whatever to do
with lawmaking.
Two things seem to explain the differences in the way that Gissel
and the Steelworkers Trilogy characterize bargaining. Gissel entailed a
first amendment challenge to a practice that had become a long-estab-
lished feature of the Labor Act's administration. 20 5 The Trilogy, in
contrast, involved a question of statutory interpretation. The Court
consistently has gone to great lengths to protect the Labor Act from
even the hint of unconstitutionality. Downplaying the significance of
bargaining helps the Court to avoid clashes with the first amendment.
The Gissel opinion may be tinged with disingenuousness. More
to the point, however, the differences between the cases reflect the fact
that language has a constitutive influence on its users. During the period
that separates Gissel from the Trilogy-the decade of the 1960s-the
use of the language of individualism had become increasingly promi-
nent in first amendment discourse. Language is more than instrumen-
tal; no user of a particular language wholly can insulate herself from
the habits of thought and understandings of reality that language sug-
gests and ingrains. This is the reason that "all language ... has its
dangers: All languages threaten to take over the mind and to control
its operation, with all this implies for one's feelings, for one's sense of
self, and for the possibilities of meaning in one's actions and rela-
tions.- 20 6 The Court, and the readers of its decisions, are hardly ex-
cepted from language's influence.
202. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
203. Warrior & Gulf 363 U.S. at 578. Likewise, in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), the Court likened the union to a legislature and held that in
exercising its lawmaking functions, the union was forbidden to make invidious distinctions
based on race.
204. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 580.
205. For an authoritative review and critique of the Board's regulation of campaign
conduct, see J. GETMAN & B. POOREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC PROCESSES, LAW
AND PRACTICE 35-63 (1988).
206. White, Thinking About Our Language, 96 YALE L.J. 1960, 1966 (1987) (footnote
omitted).
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Not surprisingly, the habits of thought that our language of indi-
vidualism encourage also find expression in labor cases that arise at
the sub-constitutional level. Thus, for example, in its landmark Borg-
Warner opinion,20 7 the Court construed the Labor Act to contain a
distinction between mandatory and permissive bargaining topics, hold-
ing that parties legally are required only to bargain over the former.
Consequently, the status of a topic depends ultimately upon its char-
acterization by the judiciary. The real significance of this case does not
lie in its impact on the identity of the subjects with which the parties
deal.20 8 Rather, this case and its progeny have afforded the Court a
means to shape for itself-and for the readers of its opinions-a view
about the nature of the Labor Act's lawmaking processes and the types
of issues capable of being handled within it. Likewise, these cases have
influenced views about the types of concerns about which employee
associations appropriately and legitimately may speak. To a large extent
then, the Borg- Warner line of cases has created a vicious circle in which
the Court's understanding about the purposes and functions of unions
and collective bargaining is based upon its own characterization of
them.
Our individualistic discourse has two further consequences for the
way the Court treats unions as well as other associations. As noted,
this discourse suggests that associations be viewed as limited purpose
alliances. It invites the Court to identify an association's range of pur-
poses and to evaluate the legitimacy of decisions made within the as-
sociation by judging them against those ends. As a result, the Court
has become increasingly involved in the internal affairs of associations
like unions. The Court's recent opinion in Pattern Makers League v.
NLRB20 9 furnishes a good illustration of this sort of involvement and
its ramifications. At issue in Pattern Makers was the legality of a pro-
vision in a union's constitution that forbade members from resigning
while a strike was ongoing or imminent. The provision only bound
those who actually had assumed union membership. Persons who were
not members, such as the plaintiffs in Abood, were not affected. The
Court construed the Labor Act to find that such restrictions were il-
legitimate. As Justice Blackmun stated in his dissent, the Court did so
even though the affected workers "freely made the decision to join the
union and freely made the promise not to resign at such time, and even
though union members democratically made the decision to strike in
full awareness of that promise. 2 °10 The Court's intrusion into the em-
207. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
208. For a graphic explanation of this point, see Feller, Response, I I N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 136, 137-39 (1982-83).
209. 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
210. Id. at 117 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609 (1984), fits the same motif. Roberts is discussed supra text at notes 141-48.
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ployee association has several unfortunate proclivities. The Court's
involvement tends to diminish or to preclude altogether the continu-
ance of a conversation within the union, by those directly affected,
about what is fair and why. It also removes from members the op-
portunity to take direct responsibility for the course of action settled
upon. It instead imposes a solution formulated by an arm of the state-
in this instance, a court-which is both unelected and generally unfa-
miliar with the problems of the workplace. Such a decision tends to
corrode the association. It supplants the institution of collective bar-
gaining as a system of self-governance with an order promulgated pri-
marily by the courts.
Our individualistic discourse has another consequence for the way
we conceive of the nature of association. It suggests that associations
are artifices that exist only through the sufferance and protection of
government. Hence, government becomes the proper judge of the sub-
jects of concern to an association; activities beyond the scope of these
concerns are tantamount to being ultra vires. They are seen as violating
the association's implicit state-granted "charter." Thus, for example,
the Court in Allied strongly agreed with the First Circuit's view that it
is "more rather than less objectionable that a national labor union has
chosen to marshall against neutral parties the considerable powers de-
rived by its locals and itself under federal labor laws in aid of a random
political objective."21 Political protests over foreign policy exceeded
what the Court viewed as the legitimate scope of a union's concern.
This approach to associations ignores the truth expressed in an
observation made long ago by Otto Gierke that many groups preexisted
the state and would continue regardless of state sanction or recognition,
and thus, it is a mistake to see the state as the only grounds of a group's
existence or the appropriate arbiter of its proper concerns.212 This point,
echoed by Maitland, Maine and others in the common law tradition,
is worth remembering. It is especially true of unions, whose early de-
velopment in this country (and nearly all of whose development in
England) occurred without the sanction or the protection of the state,
and indeed despite of its antipathy, which so often found expression
through the judiciary.
Given this discourse, it is hardly surprising that the Court's efforts
to accommodate the Wagner Act's scheme to first amendment doctrine
have resulted in distortions. More remarkable, perhaps, is that the
211. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225-26
(1982).
212. The best-known piece of Gierke's work available in English is his POLITICAL
THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (1900) translated by F.W. Maitland, who also wrote for it
a justly celebrated introduction. For a brief essay setting forth his theories of groups and the
law's response to them, see Gierke, Das Wesen der menschlichen Verbande (1902) (translated
as The Nature of Human Associations, in J. LEWIS, THE GENOSSENSCHAFT-THEORY OF OTTO
VON GIERKE 139 (1935)).
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Court has attempted accommodations at all. Accounting for these ef-
forts is the task of the next section.
V. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT:
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND LANGUAGE
At least two factors explain the Court's willingness to grant such
wide deference to a statute that in both its Wagner and Taft-Hartley
provisions is inconsistent with judicially developed first amendment
norms. One is a sensitive recognition of the difficulty in legislating in
the field of labor relations. As Clyde Summers observed some time
ago, in enacting labor legislation, Congress does "not move by small
steps but rather by sporadic leaps." '213 Since 1935, only two major
amendments to the statute have been enacted, those in 1947 and 1959.
In 1974, Congress revised the Labor Act (ironically enough, at the
urging of Senator Taft, son of the sponsor of the 1947 amendments)
to again include within its coverage the employees of nonprofit health
care institutions who had been excluded by the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments. 21 4 The following year, however, Congress failed to override the
veto of a bill that would have amended section 8(b)(4) to extend the
protection to publicize disputes at the worksite to construction work-
ers.21 5 Although hearings on and inquiries into the Labor Act and its
administration are a regular feature of the work of the Congress, there
have been, with very minor exceptions, 216 no further changes in the
statutes' terms. Given the difficulty of achieving consensus in this area,.
the Court properly seems most reluctant to jeopardize whatever scheme
Congress adopts. The Court's repeated citation to Justice Blackmun's
partial concurrence in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local
1001 (Safeco)217 manifests this hesitancy. Justice Blackmun's willing-
ness to uphold section 8(b)(4)'s ban against peaceful consumer picketing
was only because of his reluctance "to hold unconstitutional Congress'
striking of the delicate balance between union freedom of
213. Summers, A Summary Evaluation of the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 405, 405 (1958).
214. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395-97 (1974) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)) (the Health-
Care Amendments).
215. H.R. 5900, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This bill, the so-called common-situs
picketing bill, was intended legislatively to overrule the Court's decision in NLRB v. Denver
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951), by permitting construction site work-
stoppages "directed at any of several employers who are in the construction industry and are
jointly engaged as joint-venturers or in the relationship of contractors and subcontrac-
tors...."
216. For example, an Act of November 8, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, title IV, § 402(31),
98 Stat. 3360 (1984) repealed 29 U.S.C. § 160(i) which provided for expeditious hearings on
certain petitions.
217. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
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expression" 218 and the protection of neutrals that is the provision's
asserted rationale. He further indicated that his vote "should not be
read as foreclosing an opposite conclusion where another statutory ban
on peaceful picketing, unsupported by equally substantial government
interests, is at issue." 2 19 In short, labor is different.
A second factor that explains the Court's deferential approach to
the Labor Act, at least in the face of first amendment challenges, is the
problematic character of the statute as a whole. To find any portion of
the Labor Act unconstitutional might risk bringing down the statute
in its entirety. For example, if the provisions of section 8(b)(4) were
found to constitute (as they plainly do in light of prevailing first amend-
ment doctrine) an unconstitutional restriction on union speech rights,
would not the restrictions of employer speech in union organizing cam-
paigns, upheld in Gissel, be equally suspect? Anxieties about a slippery
slope abound, and are manifested in opinions like Allied in which the
Court lamely asserts, absent explanation, that the statutory restriction
of union speech constitutes no infringement of first amendment rights.
The Court may well be perplexed over some comprehensive way to
think about labor and first amendment issues. It is aware that it treats
employee associations differently. Because of the conflicting languages,
stories about associations, and notions of the human being that the
Labor Act as a whole embodies, the Court has little other choice unless
it is prepared to assume completely the role of architect of labor re-
lations schemes. It prudently has resisted fully taking this last step.
Certainly, as seen, its intrusion into what is supposed to be a private
ordering system has produced sufficiently unhappy results. 2 20 Their
amelioration through further judicial involvement is most unlikely.
Nor would the habits and practices of self-government be furthered by
the judicial override of the legislative process-even when its product
is a piece of legislation as internally inconsistent as- the National Labor
Relations Act.
The conflict between the Labor Act and the first amendment is
more than a doctrinal problem that can be left to the Court for its
resolution. Similarly, it stands as more than a question of drafting that
can be settled by quick legislative action, or that the more attentive
use of language alone can remedy. Rather, the entire matter is repre-
sentative of a series of complex issues that de Tocqueville described
as "mores," a term which he meant to refer "not only to 'moeurs' in
218. Id. at 617 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in result).
219. Id. at 618.
220. Spiros Simitis has described this trend as the "juridification of labor relations."
See Simitis, Juridification of Labor Relations, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL
WELFARE LAw 113, 122-23 (G. Teubner ed. 1987). For a discussion of the idea of juridifi-
cation, see Teubner, Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in id. at 3.
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the strict sense, which might be called the habits of the heart, but also
to the different notions possessed by men, the various opinions current
among them, and the sum of ideas that shape mental habits. '22 ' One
way to put the question for resolution here is to ask what role asso-
ciation plays in self-governance. To attempt its answer invites serious
investigation of the unspoken notions, assumptions, and attitudes that
shape and bound our intellectual horizons. It also necessitates inquiring
into the extent to which the habits of thought that both mold and are
molded by our legal rules and discourse are consistent with setting the
conditions for authentic self-governance and individual liberty.
VI. SETTING THE CONDITIONS FOR SELF-RULE: RE-IMAGINING
UNIONS, ASSOCIATION AND HUMAN CHARACTER
Individual autonomy is the predominant American ideology. In-
deed, for many-and especially for lawyers-the very mention of such
evocative terms as liberty, rights or choice almost immediately calls to
mind the word individual. As a society, through our legal system, we
place a paramount value on protecting and furthering the ability of
individuals to decide, judge and choose for themselves. Nevertheless,
despite our Whitmanesque emphasis on the "single, separate person"
we remain aware, however vaguely, of the importance of community
and association to our lives. The Roberts Court, for example, recognized
the significance of association even as it struggled to come to grips with
the meaning of the term. The Court's difficulty poignantly reflects the
ambivalent ideas most Americans hold about community, association
and obligation. Manifestations of this ambivalence surround us. Thus,
for example, Robert Bellah and his colleagues found that most Amer-
icans are unable to express themselves in other than what the authors
termed the "first language" of individualism. Consequently, the Bellah
group suggests, most Americans have difficulty in articulating the rich-
ness of their commitments and their notions about association and
community.222 The two stories the Labor Act tells about the individual
and association furnishes a concrete example of this ambivalence-and
testifies to the difficulty we encounter in attempting to resolve it. The
idea of the person that our discourse (and particularly that our legal
discourse) conveys implies that community and individual exist in an
unresolvable tension. This discourse tells only part of the story; it leaves
us with the distortions that result from having but a partial perspective.
While portraying the potential for harm that community can pose to
221. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 110, at 287.
222. HABITS, supra note 12, at 20-2 1. For further discussion of Bellah's two languages,
see supra note 12.
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the individual through its shared biases, our discourse tends strongly
to conceal the insight that community also grounds and opens the
possibilities for the achievement of one's individuality. What appears
to be an unanswerable dilemma may instead be the result of having
put forth the wrong questions. As Alexander Bickel reminded us, "[n]o
answer is what the wrong question begets."' 223 Until we are able to pose
different questions, we will remain in a quandary. While we sense the
importance of association and fear its loss, we also see association as
a threat to our individuality and our ability to choose for ourselves. A
start in a more fruitful direction may be to ask what our notion of
individualism assumes about the individual and the activity of self-
determination.
True individualism has been described as "a rejection of pre-
sumptive control from without. ' 224 A fundamental difficulty with our
current individualistic language of choice and freedom-particularly as
we employ it in our first amendment discourse-is that it deflects our
attention from considering the conditions that nurture and further in-
dividual reflection and choice. Yet, self-government, and thereby, in-
dividual liberty depend on reflection and choice. 2 5
A. De Tocqueville's Tyranny of Individualism
Writing in the mid-1830s de Tocqueville observed that the term
individualism had been "recently coined to express a new idea."' 22 6 Our
parents, he wrote, "only knew about egoism," a condition he described
as a passionate and exaggerated love of self which leads people to think
of everything in terms of themselves, and to prefer themselves before
all others.227 While egoism springs from blind instinct, the new idea
that individualism expresses "is based on misguided judgment rather
than depraved feeling," and "due more to inadequate understanding
rather than to perversity of heart., 228 In contrast to egoism, individ-
ualism "is a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen
to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the
circle of family and friends; with this little society formed to his taste,
he gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself. '229 Individual-
223. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 103 (1962), quoted in J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 43 (1980).
224. Weaver, Two Types ofAmerican Individualism, in THE SOUTHERN ESSAYS OF
RICHARD M. WEAVER 77, 82 (1987).
225. In the first number of The Federalist Papers, Hamilton emphasized that the
question facing Americans as they considered the proposed Constitution was this: Can Amer-
icans establish "good government from reflection and choice"? If not, "accident and force"
would determine the order of their lives.
226. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 110, at 506.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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ism, de Tocqueville observed, originated in democracy and threatened
to grow as conditions of democratic social equality spread. Individu-
alism's effect, he forecast, would ingrain in people "the habit of thinking
of themselves in isolation" and imagining "that their whole destiny is
in their own hands."-230
De Tocqueville warned that such conditions imperil a democracy's
existence. Despotism guarantees its continuation through the isolation
of its citizens. Although dangerous in all times, despotism is especially
to be feared in a democracy because the "vices originating in despotism
are precisely those favored" by the conditions democracy promotes. 231
Thus, "the two opposites fatally complete and support each other." 232
Democratic individualism "puts men side by side without a common
link to hold them firm. Despotism raises barriers to keep them apart.
It disposes them not to think of their fellows and turns indifference
into a sort of public virtue. '233
De Tocqueville counseled that the kind of despotism that threatens
a modern democracy would be of a different character than the des-
potism of the past. It would consist of soft tyranny, whose effects
"would degrade men rather than torment them." 234 In this kind of
deformed democracy, the populace, preoccupied by their own concerns,
will pay little attention to, and assume almost no role in, public affairs.
Over a people so habituated, government will stand as a protective
power.235 It seemingly will work for the citizenry's happiness by an-
ticipating and providing for their needs, managing and settling their
concerns, and ordering their affairs. Such a governmental order daily
makes the exercise of individual reflection and choice "less useful and
rarer"; little by little it "robs each citizen of the proper use of his own
faculties" as it continually extends the reach and scope of its decision-
making over matters both great and slight.236 Intervention of this de-
formed democratic government into small affairs, de Tocqueville cau-
tioned, is more pernicious than its control over large matters.
"Subjection in petty affairs is manifest daily and touches all citizens
indiscriminately. '237 It habituates citizens to dependence rather than
self-direction. Increasingly, in these circumstances, democracy will
come to exist in name only. Citizens will "quit their state of dependence
just long enough to choose their masters and then fall back into it." 238
Democracy's core, individual self-direction, will have collapsed.
230. Id. at 508.
231. Id. at 509-10.
232. Id. at 510.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 691.
235. Id. at 692.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 694.
238. Id. at 693.
The Conditions for Self-Rule
The malignant effects of individualism on persons and democratic
institutions alike, de Tocqueville pointed out, had been neutralized in
the United States through the populace's well-ingrained habit of form-
ing themselves into associations. This habit encouraged citizens to ac-
complish the ends of daily life for themselves, without reliance on
government. Associations thus placed control over and responsibility
for these affairs directly into the citizenry's hands. Consequently, self-
government at both the individual and institutional level was enhanced,
and personal autonomy increased. Associations thus acted as schools
for democracy, where the habits of self-rule were inculcated and prac-
ticed. Because of the importance of association to establishing and
maintaining the conditions necessary to personal and political self-rule,
de Tocqueville concluded that if people "are to remain civilized or to
become civilized, the art of association must develop and improve
among them .... "239
B. Unions and Associations as Schools for Democracy
Although our language and the habits of thought that it encourages
may conceal the fact from us, unions are the type of association that
de Tocqueville described. As institutions, unions can enable citizens
to assume control over and responsibility for the order that governs
their everyday lives in the workplace and beyond.24 ° Re-imagining what
a union is can lead unions to become more like schools for democracy
than some presently are. It also can enhance our views about the nature
of association generally. More importantly, it can cause us to reconsider
the conditions that foster self-governance.
By providing a forum in which to discuss, deliberate and choose
what is to be done about the practical affairs of everyday life, unions
can involve people in a conversation about what ought to be valued
and why. Such discussions are normative; participation in them engages
people in the most distinctly human of activities, reflection and choice.
What is so crucial about such conversations is that they require people
to decide for themselves the kind of people they will be. Consequently,
they engage people in self-rule at both the personal and the institutional
239. Id. at 517. On the constitutiveness of the involvement of the citizenry in the
activities of self-rule and the manner in which these support democratic institutions, also
see de Tocqueville's description of New England township government in id. at 61-98.
240. As Derek Bok and John Dunlop point out, unions not only give employees a
voice in establishing the order of the workplace. They also furnish "a coordinated and coherent
political voice to workers who would otherwise be largely disorganized." Unions thus en-
courage "the political participation of the poorer segments of society" who traditionally are
the most apathetic. D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 425
(1970). On the strength of unions' political power, see R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT
Do UNIONS Do? 191-206 (1984).
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level. Participating in decisions about eligibility for promotions and
advanced training, health and education benefits, the discipline of fel-
low employees or the best way to handle a novel employment relations
issue may seem insignificant. Certainly, these matters lack the glamour
that attaches to Supreme Court deliberations or Congressional debates.
But it is a mistake to regard these issues as too mundane for serious
attention. As de Tocqueville so clearly understood, individuals and
society alike become self-governing only by repeatedly and regularly
engaging in acts of self-government. It is the habit that sustains the
condition. Thus, a democracy encounters the greatest danger of being
perverted when people no longer have direct responsibility for making
the day-to-day decisions about the order of their lives.
The importance of the association in establishing the conditions
for deliberation and judgment, though frequently overlooked, is crucial.
As de Tocqueville so early foresaw, in modern democracies, "public
opinion becomes more and more mistress of the world."24 Since people
have "the same means of knowledge" they think it is reasonable that
"truth will be found on the side of the majority." '242 Majority opinion-
or at least what is asserted to constitute the majority's way of thinking
by those who control the mass means of its expression-thus poses a
subtle but pernicious threat to the exercise of personal judgment. Be-
cause the individual is supplied "with a quantity of ready-made opin-
ions" he may be relieved "of the necessity of forming his own."2 4 3
Associations such as unions can reduce this danger. If it is to be suc-
cessful, the course of action a union pursues on any matter must reflect
the consensus of the "rank and file." As with any group decision, con-
sensus represents the product of a discussion. Involvement in a dis-
cussion carries with it the potential for discovering what others actually
believe. It thereby challenges the participants to examine and explain
the basis for their own opinions. By encouraging people to think and
act for themselves, association acts as an inhibitor of the conditions
that spawn de Tocqueville's soft tyranny. The mindless adoption of
the ready made is always possible. But, it is less likely when people
bear direct responsibility for a decision, and must live daily with its
results.
Small groups greatly facilitate discussion and deliberation. They
make more likely the personal knowledge, friendship and trust among
participants that ground the possibility of conversation and consensus.
Ideally then, unions should be as. small as practicable. Further, nego-
tiations (i.e., the lawmaking process) should occur at the local level.
Unfortunately, the impulse of the Taft-Hartley amendments is to push
unions and bargaining in the opposite direction. Through its broad and
241. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 110, at 435.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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undifferentiated ban on secondary activities, the law prohibits small
employee associations from calling upon one another for support during
labor disputes.2" Nothing in the Court's DeBartolo II decision chal-
lenges this ban. Since small associations may not call upon one another
for support, unions may attempt to increase their economic power by
increasing their size. They may also seek to move negotiations away
from the local level to one where greater pressure can be brought to
bear in times of crises. These alternatives undermine the features of
employee associations that most contribute to maintaining conditions
that promote self-rule. They also concentrate attention on unions as
economic power organizations to the exclusion of the roles they play
in fostering a democracy. Thus, the impact of Taft-Hartley is not con-
fined to restricting union communicative activities. The amendments
unintentionally create incentives for the growth of large, centralized
union organizations, while they corrode the structures that encourage
individual reflection and choice.
Unions can aid in inculcating the habits of decision, commitment
and direct responsibility that a democracy requires. But, they can make
other contributions as well. By functioning as "communities of mem-
ory," unions can reduce the personal isolation and indifference that
pose a pernicious threat to self-rule. 245 A community is a group of
socially interdependent people who participate together in discussion
and decisionmaking, and who share certain practices that define and
support the community.246 Such communities are constituted in part
by their pasts. Consequently, for a community to be intelligible to itself
and to others, and for it to retain and transmit its meaning, community
must become "involved in retelling its story, its constitutive narra-
tive.- 247 In so doing, a community offers examples of the men and
women who have embodied the ideals and meanings about which the
community coheres.
244. Whether the law should recognize distinctions in boycotts based on their ob-
jectives was part of the debate over the terms of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act. Representative
of one view was President Truman, who in calling for new labor legislation in his 1947 State
of the Union address, said:
Not all secondary boycotts are unjustified. We must judge them on the basis of their
objectives. For example, boycotts intended to protect wage rates and working con-
ditions should be distinguished from those in furtherance ofjurisdictional disputes.
The structure of industry sometimes requires unions, as a matter of self-preservation,
to extend the conflict beyond a particular employer.
93 CONG. REC. 5292, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT, 1947, Vol. II at 1511 (NLRB 1959). For an exchange between Senator Pepper,
who supported President Truman's views on differentiating between boycotts, and Senator
Taft, who insisted that boycotts are indistinguishable, see 93 CONG. REC. 4321-4327, reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, Vol. II at
1104-14 (NLRB 1959).
245. For a further discussion of this idea, see Habits, supra note 12, at 152-55.
246. See id. at 333.
247. Id.
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Our individualistic discourse encourages us to evaluate unions
solely in terms of their members' shared financial concerns. Once again,
however, our language has shown us only a portion of the picture, and
indeed has concealed some of its most important aspects. Unions not
only enhance the activities of self-rule, they also provide that "common
link" between people necessary-to the support of a democracy. This
link is supplied in part by involving people in the conversation that
informs ordering decisions, but it does not stop there. By recalling to
contemporaries the debt they owe to previous generations, unions can
remind the present generation of their obligations to those yet to come.
Healthy unions also assist in supporting other types of communities-
such as families, neighborhoods, religious organizations and civic
groups. The same "mores" or habits that support one community are
required to maintain the others. These habits of thought and action
must be practiced in order to be maintained and understood. Hence,
communities are themselves socially interdependent; in the absence of
others, no single association or community is likely to flourish or sur-
vive, particularly in the circumstances that a modem democracy tends
to promote.
C. Human Character and Association
De Tocqueville's emphasis on the importance of association to
self-rule parallels themes in classical political philosophy, which insists
on understanding humans as situated beings. In contrast to modern
political theory, the classical viewpoint cannot conceive of the human,
and what is desirable for the human, in the abstract. In its view, humans
are intelligible only in relation to those associations that fundamentally
condition human existence. Consequently, in the classical tradition,
community is prior to the individual. Determinations about political,
moral or economic orders, indeed knowledge itself, are possible only
through community. In turn, community exists as the outgrowth of a
civic or political friendship among a diversified multitude of people.
In the classical viewpoint, humans are seen as coming together to satisfy
needs and to sustain life. Because of their shared capacity for reflecting,
understanding and judging, however, they stay together to achieve a
good life, the highest value of which is developing the potential of all
for self-rule and authentic freedom. Hence, the goal of community is
the common good. In the modern viewpoint, the good strongly tends
to be equated with economic well-being and a claim upon resources.
As a result, the good in the modern framework typically is thought of
as.finite and particular. The generation and distribution of the good
are primarily problems for economics. In the classical view, in contrast,
the good for humans is thought of in terms of the perfection of those
The Conditions for Self-Rule
capacities which are the most distinctly human-reflection and choice.
Thus, the good is not some finite thing peculiar to a specific individual,
but something in which all have the capacity to share in common. A
well-ordered society is seen as a partnership, founded upon the aim of
achieving the good (and hence, a flourishing) life for all. The full char-
acter of this good life, and how best to obtain it, are determined through
a conversation, presently and across time, about the sound and the
hurtful, the just and the less desirable, in light of real-life problems that
exist now and require concrete solutions. This conversation, called by
the classics a civilis conversatio, is normative. By participating in it,
one's authentic human potential is actuated and enhanced. Thus, Ar-
istotle could observe that a person without community "is either a
beast or a god."'2 4 8 In this framework, the properly constituted com-
munity represents an irreducible good. To attempt to extract the human
from community, to consider the human in the abstract, is nonsensical.
The attempt to do so leads to an impoverished and grossly distorted
account of what it means to be human. The individual situated in a
community constitutes the concrete stuff of social reality, and marks
the proper starting point for deliberating about political questions and
ordering arrangements.
As seen in this Article, our first amendment discourse-and our
discourse generally-now proceeds in a framework that posits a very
different view. The human prior to and isolated from community con-
stitutes the starting point for prescribing the character of the legal and
political order. Since humans in this viewpoint are conceived as being
invested with rights that exist by nature, independently of any social
context, the right is prior to the good. Likewise, the good for humans
involves no particular conception of a good life. Instead, what is good
only reflects a specific individual's taste for a particular object or ac-
tivity. Association may assist that person in acquiring the desired object
or end. But, it is not prerequisite to her understanding the things she
desires, since these are peculiar to her. Engaging in a conversation to
identify the character of the good or desirable is not only pointless, but
impossible. Consequently, association is an artifice. It comes into being
only to serve an individual's exigent needs, which are conceived as
being primarily economic (i.e., comfortable self-survival) and wholly
self-directed. As a result, association is intelligible only in terms of the
aggregate of individuals of which it is comprised. It represents no value
in itself; any good it has is merely derivative. In this view, community
is instrumental and exists only to satisfy some need; associative activ-
ities beyond this description simply are unintelligible.
Obviously, there is much that separates our current first amend-
ment discourse from that evoked by the writings of de Tocqueville or
248. ARISTOTLE, supra note 129, at 37 (Bk I, ch. 2, 1253a 25-30).
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Burke. One of the most prominent differences between these discourses
is the view each conveys about the importance of association to in-
dividual liberty and self-rule. In the classical viewpoint that Burke and
de Tocqueville evoke, community among people is possible only be-
cause of the qualities people share in common: their capacities to be
free, reasonable and responsible beings. In the classical framework, the
unique expression of these common qualities that each person embod-
ies is not denied. Participation in community arouses and enhances
the individual's unique potential; it furnishes the means by which hu-
mans can become truly self-determining and free individuals. Absent
association, the conditions for self-rule and individual autonomy dis-
appear. Our first amendment discourse, in contrast, suggests that com-
munity among people is possible only to the most limited degree. Our
discourse devalues the capacity of the average person to act reasonably
and responsibly. It strongly tends to equate autonomy with isolation
and to view insulation from others as the ultimate ground for self-rule.
Ideas do have consequences. Whether we like it or not, we are all
philosophers. We constantly employ ideas, however vague and indis-
tinct, about what humans are and what motivates them. This is par-
ticularly true for those of us who are lawyers or judges. Our work
continuously calls upon us to suggest and to decide the way our lives
together as a society should be ordered and conducted. In our work,
we have increasingly employed-especially during the past thirty or so
years-a first amendment discourse that expresses certain views about
the nature of association, self-rule, and the meaning of personhood.
This discourse has not been without its effects. It has taught us to view
association darkly, through the lens of suspicion. It has encouraged the
judiciary to review the determinations arrived at within unions and
associations, and to displace those with which it disagrees. Whether
intentional or not, the trend of the cases has been the restriction, and
ultimately the dissolution, of association. The implicit message of the
cases to the public is to rely on the state, and not upon themselves, for
arranging the order of daily life. Association, the cases suggest, is too
fickle and prone to corruption to be trusted. Most disturbing of all, our
discourse implies that people generally lack the capacity to participate
in governmental decisionmaking.
Despite the problematic nature of the meanings and consequences
of our first amendment discourse, we have subjected it to little critical
scrutiny. It is time that we do so. The unthinking adoption of any
discourse is dangerous. It makes us subject to, rather than the masters
of, the attitudes, assumptions and limits that a language imports to its
users. Because of the boundaries imposed by the unexamined use of a
discourse, we all too often fail to see the questions that must be an-
swered if we are to understand properly the situations that confront
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One of the truest observations Rousseau made is that "[flreedom
can be acquired, but never regained. '2 49 We put much at risk if we fail
to pay attention to the conditions that support self-rule. A good place
to start our inquiry is to ask what our first amendment discourse as-
sumes about the individual and the activity of reflection and choice
on which self-rule depends. Being more attentive to our discourse and
its meanings will also help to examine the accuracy of the views it
suggests about the character of association, and the contribution it
makes to authentic personal autonomy. Most importantly, attention to
our first amendment discourse may open a new conversation, with new
questions, about the type of people we are and wish to become. The
development of a new first amendment discourse, one that can com-
prehend the individual as associationally situated, promises much fruit.
CONCLUSION
"No science can be more secure than the unconscious metaphysics
which it tacitly presupposes," 250 warned Alfred North Whitehead. The
science of law is no exception. One of the primary concerns of this
Article has been to question whether present first amendment doctrine
acts to corrode rather than enhance the conditions that support self-
rule. Consequently, it has examined the views about human nature,
association, and the activity of self-rule that our first amendment dis-
course assumes. The Article conducted this inquiry by examining a
concrete problem: the tension that exists between first amendment doc-
trine and the National Labor Relations Act. The Article's first two
sections examined the Court's recent and seemingly mundane opinion
in DeBartolo II and discovered it to be a deceptively simple decision.
The case is a paradigm of the way the Court has attempted to reconcile
the Labor Act's Taft-Hartley provisions, and the restrictions they im-
pose on union speech, to the conflicting demands of first amendment
doctrine. The Article found that DeBartolo II restates Taft-Hartley's
restrictions on union appeals to the public as Congress originally in-
tended them. Unions now are permitted to make appeals to the public
through any means but picketing. The Article analyzed the ramifica-
tions of Taft-Hartley for the way we think about union speech. It con-
sidered the significance of DeBartolo II for first amendment jurispru-
dence and the issues the case left unresolved. It concludes that
DeBartolo II is far from resolving the tensions between the first amend-
ment and the Labor Act's Taft-Hartley provisions. The Article's third
section examined the cause for the tension that exists between the Labor
249, J.-J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 134, at 71 (Bk II, ch.VIII).
250. Quoted as the epigraph to M. MEYERS, THE SOUL OF MODERN ECONOMIC MAN:
IDEAS OF SELF-INTEREST, THOMAS HOBBES TO ADAM SMITH (1983).
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Act's Wagner provisions and the first amendment. It found that the
Wagner Act and first amendment doctrine employ different discourses
that reflect different understandings of human nature, reason and the
character. of association. The Article showed how the ideas about as-
sociation that inform our first amendment discourse are manifested in
the way the Court conceives of the nature of the family relationship.
It also examined views about the character of association that an al-
ternative discourse suggests. Like the Wagner Act, this alternative dis-
course is framed in terms that place a high value on association, and
sees association as the grounds for self-rule. The Article also found that
the Labor Act's Taft-Hartley provisions are framed in the same highly
individualistic language that our first amendment discourse employs.
This reveals that the National Labor Relations Act essentially is a
statute at war with itself. It also explains the different character of the
first amendment problems that each portion of the statute presents.
The Article's fourth section investigated how the Court has attempted
to reconcile the Wagner Act to first amendment doctrine. This section
reveals how the individualistic discourse of first amendment doctrine
influences the way the Court perceives unions. Emblematic of the ten-
sion between the first amendment and the Wagner Act is the latter's
exclusivity principle. This principle establishes the union formed by a
majority of employees to be the representative of all. The Court has
considered the constitutionality of this principle in a series of cases
that deal with union security agreements. These agreements require all
employees, including dissenters, to pay union dues where such an agree-
ment is in force. The Court consistently has upheld the constitutionality
of these statutorily approved agreements, even though it has charac-
terized them as presenting substantial first amendment freedom of as-
sociation problems. How it has done so reflects the influence of our
first amendment discourse.
Consistent with the ideas that inform this discourse, the union-
security cases reveal that the Court increasingly has come to perceive
of unions as limited purpose affiliations, whose main goal is to increase
their members' incomes. Perceiving associations like unions as such
limited purpose organizations has invited the Court to evaluate the
legitimacy of determinations arrived at within such organizations, and
to displace those which are inconsistent with the judicially-identified
purpose for an association's existence. Since unions exist to enhance
their members' economic well-being, unions may not require those
nonmember employees they represent to pay for costs other than those
directly pertaining to the unions' collective bargaining activities. This
foreshortened notion of the purpose of unions has found expression in
cases beyond the union-shop line. The Court's understanding of as-
sociation has encouraged increasing state intrusion into their internal
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affairs. This has the effect of dissolving the association, and displacing
it with an organ of the state.
In its fifth section, the Article explained the reasons for the Court's
attempt to defer to the terms of National Labor Relations Act even
though the statute is inconsistent with first amendment doctrine. The
difficulty of legislating in the labor area is one explanation. Further,
the Court fears that finding any portion of the Labor Act unconstitu-
tional might risk bringing down the statute as a whole.
The Article closed with an extensive consideration of our first
amendment discourse and the problematic character of the views that
inform it. The Article considered de Tocqueville's observations about
the importance of association to setting the conditions for self-rule. It
examined the contributions unions can make as "schools for democ-
racy." The Article observed that de Tocqueville's emphasis on the im-
portance of association to self-rule parallels themes represented in clas-
sical political philosophy. It examined these themes, and contrasted
them with the ideas that inform our present first amendment discourse.
The Article closed by criticizing our unthinking use of first amendment
discourse. It warned that this discourse deflects our attention from
considering the conditions that nurture and further the individual re-
flection and choice on which self-government depends. It encourages
us to open a new conversation that may lead to the development of a
new discourse that can conceive of the importance of association to
self-rule and authentic liberty.
The purpose of this Article is not to deny the dangers that asso-
ciations may pose to dissenters. Nor does it recommend that a simple-
minded return to classical political philosophy-or what we conceive
it to be-is the solution to our problems. Rather, it has tried to point
out the significant problems inherent in our present approach, and to
suggest some alternative ways for us to begin to think about how best
to secure the conditions for self-rule. It is easy cynically to overlook
the role unions can play in establishing and maintaining these condi-
tions. However, as recent events in Poland and Eastern Europe dem-
onstrate, that role indeed can be remarkably powerful.
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